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INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of worldwide over-the-counter ("OTC") deriv-
atives' markets has put intense pressure on traditional regulatory clas-
sifications.2 Indeed, several spectacular losses3 have highlighted the
challenges derivatives pose to the domestic securities and commodi-
1. Under the conventional definition, a derivative is, as its name suggests, a fi-
nancial instrument whose value derives from the value of an underlying asset, refer-
ence rate, or index. An over-the-counter ("OTC") derivative is individually
negotiated off any formally organized exchange. Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Prac-
tices and Principles, at 2-3, 28 (July 1993) [hereinafter Group of Thirty Report]. Be-
yond this general definition, establishing a more precise meaning for the variety of
transactions encompassed by the umbrella term "derivatives" is difficult. See Martin
Mayer, The Bankers 290 (1997) ("The conventional definition [of derivatives] is mis-
leading, because most financial instruments turn out on examination to change in
value as a function of what happens to other financial instruments."); Saul S. Cohen,
The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1993, 1993, 1997 (1995) ("It is com-
monly remarked that there is no generally accepted meaning to the term deriva-
tive.... Attempting to define derivatives is very difficult because instruments capable
of bearing that label are infinitely protean ... ."). Although acknowledging that the
term "bet" has a pejorative quality, Martin Mayer has described derivatives in the
following way- "A derivative is a bet, not an investment-a bet on the direction,
dimension, duration and speed of changes in the value of another financial instru-
ment." Mayer, supra at 290. Because derivatives have been at the center of much
recent controversy, see infra note 3, other commentators have described them in
terms of public perception. See, e.g., Joanne T. Medero, Managing Risk of Deriva-
tives-Recent Developments Affecting Dealers and End-Users, 907 PLI/Corp 409, 411
(Nov. 1995) ("The term 'derivative' has become a buzzword, and too often refers to
any financial instrument where someone has lost money.").
2. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1997 (arguing that derivatives "evolve too rapidly
to be encompassed under any preexisting regulatory structure"); Mayer, supra note 1,
at 303-32 (describing the inherent problems of regulating derivatives). At the end of
March 1995, the gross market value of OTC derivatives contracts was estimated at a
little over $2.2 trillion and the global notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives
contracts was estimated at $47.5 trillion. Bank for International Settlements, Central
Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 1995 1 (May
1996) [hereinafter BIS Survey]. As of February 1997, the global notional amount of
outstanding OTC derivatives contracts had grown to an estimated S55 trillion. Su-
zanne McGee & Elizabeth MacDonald, Pre-Emptive Strike by Derivatives Players,
Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at C1.
3. See, e.g., Sarah Lubman & John R. Emshwiller, Before the Fall: Hubris and
Ambition in Orange County: Robert Citron's Story, Wall St. J., Jan. 18 1995, at Al
(describing Orange County Treasurer Robert Citron's aggressive use of derivatives
which ultimately led to large losses for the County); Leslie Wayne, $1.5 Billion Loss
Seen for County, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 2, 1994, at D1 (reporting a statement on December
1, 1994, by Robert Citron announcing losses from derivatives); Mayer, supra note 1, at
311 (describing the background to the Procter & Gamble derivatives losses); G. Bruce
Knecht, P & G Amends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A3
(reporting on Procter & Gamble's lawsuit against Bankers Trust for its losses on de-
rivatives transactions); Mayer, supra note 1, at 286-88 (describing the Gibson Greet-
ings suit against Bankers Trust); Michael Quint, Gibson Suit on Trades Is Settled, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24, 1994, at D1 (reporting on Gibson Greetings' settlement with Bankers
Trust for losses on derivatives transactions).
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ties regimes.4 This phenomenon is particularly apparent in the contro-
versy surrounding the regulatory status of foreign currency options.
5
The Commodity Exchange Act (the "CEA"), generally requires
that most types of commodity options be traded on designated com-
modity exchanges unless exempted by the CFTC.6 If an option is sold
in violation of the CEA, the transaction may be voided.7 In 1974,
Congress voted to exclude "transactions in foreign currency... unless
such transactions involve the sale... for future delivery conducted on
a board of trade," from CEA jurisdiction and CFTC regulation.8
While it is clear that this exclusion, commonly known as the Treasury
Amendment,9 applies to OTC spot,10 forward, and future" foreign
4. The United States's securities markets are regulated by the Securities Ex-
change Commission (the "SEC"), under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1994). Domestic commodities markets are
regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the "CFTC" or the
"Commission") under the Commodities Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994).
5. An option is one of the wide variety of instruments "that carry the label 'deriv-
atives."' Mayer, supra note 1, at 269; Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 2;
Richard W. Jennings et al., Securities Regulation 1 (7th ed. 1992). In exchange for
payment of a premium, an option contract gives the option holder the right but not
the obligation to buy (known as a "call") or sell (known as a "put") an underlying
commodity (or settle the value for cash) at a price (called the "strike price"), during a
period or on a specified date. Thus, the holder can choose not to exercise the option
and let it expire. The holder benefits from favorable movements in the price of the
underlying commodity but is not exposed to corresponding losses. An option is prof-
itable if the holder exercises the right when the current market price is above the
strike price for a call option or below the strike price for a put option. A profitable
option is said to be "in the money." John Downes & Jordan E. Goodman, Dictionary
of Finance and Investment Terms 390-91 (Barron's Financial Guides, 4th ed. 1995);
Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 32; Robert C. Lower, The Regulation of
Commodity Options, 1978 Duke L. J. 1095, 1096 n.2 (1978).
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26.
7. Id.
8. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (1994).
9. Id. This section is commonly known as the Treasury Amendment because it
was originally proposed by the Treasury Department. See John M. Quitmeyer &
David Yeres, Supreme Court to Decide Scope of CFTC Jurisdiction, 16 Future & De-
rivatives L. Rep. 18 (July 1996). The Treasury Amendment also excludes transactions
in "security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase
options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments."
7 U.S.C. § 2(ii). See infra note 105 and accompanying text for the full text of the
Treasury Amendment.
10. Spot transactions are purchases of foreign currency for immediate delivery,
generally within two days. The Committee on Futures Regulation of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign
Currency Trading 5 (1986) [hereinafter Committee on Futures Regulation]. In a spot
transaction, one party agrees to deliver a certain amount of currency in exchange for a
certain amount of another currency. The rate of exchange used in these transactions
is commonly referred to as the "spot" rate. Id. at 5.
11. A forward contract obligates one counterparty to buy, and the other to sell, a
specified underlying commodity at a specific price, amount, and date in the future.
Forward contracts are not standardized but are customized with terms and conditions
tailored to fit the objectives of the counterparties with respect to contract size, deliv-
ery grade, delivery locations, delivery dates, and credit terms. Committee on Futures
[Vol. 652316
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currency transactions, there has been considerable debate over
whether it applies to currency option transactions.
On one side of the debate, the CFTC has taken the position that the
Treasury Amendment does not encompass foreign currency options,
and that therefore such instruments remain subject to CFTC regula-
tion.12 The Commission believes that CEA jurisdiction is necessary to
prevent the predatory practices of unscrupulous currency operators
which have repeatedly exposed unsophisticated retail investors to sub-
stantial losses.13
On the other side of the debate, the Treasury Department and the
various commercial institutions that participate in the interbank OTC
currency option market (the "Interbank Industry" or the "Industry")
have argued that the Treasury Amendment clearly removes currency
options from the CFTC's jurisdiction.14 In the Industry's view, the
Regulation, supra note 10, at 6-7; Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 30;
Downes & Goodman, supra note 5, at 205.
Futures contracts are functionally similar to forwards in that they are agreements to
buy or sell a specific amount of an underlying commodity at a particular price on a
stipulated future date. Unlike forwards, however, futures are standardized with re-
spect to quantity and quality of the underlying commodity, the time and place of
delivery, and the method of payment, with the price being the only variable left to be
determined. Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 32; see Downes & Goodman,
supra note 5, at 214. Futures also differ from forwards in that they can generally be
satisfied through cash settlement or offset. The right to settle or offset allows futures
participants to readily cut their losses or take their profits, without negotiating. In
addition, "the anonymous nature of futures trading and the relatively small [typical]
contract size makes futures contracts accessible to members of the general public,
including retail speculators, who are unable to transact in forwards." Group of Thirty
Report, supra note 1, at 32; Downes & Goodman, supra note 5, at 205, 214.
12. See CFTC Interpretative Letter, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 (1985); see also Salomon
Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 974 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540,
reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct. 2156 (1994) ("The [CFTC], pressing for greater regulation of
transactions in foreign currencies, contends that the Treasury Amendment's exemp-
tion is intended to be narrowly tailored to exclude only spot and cash forward transac-
tions, leaving all other futures and options to be regulated by the broad inclusive
regulatory language of the [CEA]."). The organized exchanges, such as the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (the "CME") and the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT"), have
also taken this position. As one commentator has noted:
The exchanges, concerned by the burgeoning off-exchange currency mar-
kets, see the Treasury Amendment as a way to level the playing field. CBOT
Chairman Patrick H. Arbor was quoted as saying, "If off-exchange... mar-
kets in these instruments are to be exempt completely from regulation, the
exchange markets in the same instruments should enjoy the same exemptive
treatment."
Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20.
13. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 974 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting the
CFTC argument that interpreting the Treasury Amendment to exclude OTC currency
options and futures trading from the ambit of the CEA would permit the operation of
"bucket shops and boiler rooms, the very type of fraudulent businesses Congress
sought to outlaw in enacting the CEA").
14. Letter from Charles 0. Sethness, Assistant Secretary, Department of Treasury,
to Susan M. Phillips, Chairman, CFTC (May 5, 1986), quoted in Committee on Fu-
tures Regulation, supra note 10, at 36; see also Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 18
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CFTC's aggressive assertion of jurisdiction over currency option trans-
actions reflects the Commission's tendency to seize any "opportunity
to exert authority in the publicity surrounding sizable investor losses,
regardless of the jurisdictional fit."'1 5 The Industry has legitimate con-
cerns that subjecting the OTC currency option market to the costs
associated with CFTC regulation 16 would significantly damage the
United States's ability to compete as a world financial center.17 More-
over, in the Industry's view, CFTC regulation of the interbank market
is unnecessary. Because the main players in the interbank market are
commercial banks and other highly sophisticated financial entities,
that market is already more than adequately regulated by the federal
banking agencies, or in some circumstances by the SEC.' 8
("Almost from the beginning, there has been tension between Treasury's interest in
global markets, which are dominated by large institutions that presumably do not
require much protection, and the CFTC's desire to protect investors."). The Treas-
ury's interest in sustaining the efficiency of the currency markets stems from the fact
that both it and the Federal Reserve frequently intervene in that market to effect the
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regu-
lation in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated Trade Usages, 31 Idaho L.
Rev. 863, 869 (1995); see also Ellen Thalman, G-7 Position Shift on Dollar Won't Stop
Buying Trend for Long, Analysts Say, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at C13, (describing
analysts' debate over whether remarks made by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
could be interpreted to mean that the Treasury Department would intervene to halt
the ascending strength of the dollar relative to the yen).
15. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Reg-
ulation, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1, 55-58 (1996). While it is not entirely clear why the CFTC
has been so aggressive in asserting its regulatory authority, some of its motivation
may be inferred. At one level it seems clear that the Commission desires to fulfill its
statutory mandate and to protect the integrity of the nation's commodity markets. At
another level, however, it could be suggested that the Commission's regulatory zeal is
a function of its territorial response to the "recurring proposals to absorb the CFTC
into the SEC." Id. at 82. In light of those proposals, the rapid growth of OTC deriva-
tive transactions and the competitive effect of that growth on the volume of exchange
traded transactions must be somewhat disturbing to the CFTC. CBOT Chairman Pat-
rick H. Arbor has predicted that failure to check these rapidly expanding off-ex-
change markets will ultimately obviate the need for the CFTC "because there won't
be enough trades on the CBOT" to justify CFTC regulation. Quitmeyer & Yeres,
supra note 9, at 20; see also Aaron Lucchetti, Titan Returns to Shake Up CME's
Board, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at C1, C13 (attributing the CME's 12% decline in
volumes from 1994 to 1997 partly to the fact that "[t]rading in foreign-currency ... has
been hurt by... increasing over-the-counter competition from banks").
16. The costs of CFTC regulation would include the expense of registration for
and compliance with CFTC regulation, meeting the capital requirements imposed by
the CEA, being forced to trade on a CFTC designated exchange and being exposed to
the liability associated with the private rights of action available under the CEA. See 1
Timothy J. Snider, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets, at
§§ 7.07-7.13 (2d ed. 1995).
17. See Amicus Brief for the Foreign Exchange Committee at 6, Dunn v. Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n, 1996 WL 392512 (No. 95-1181) (noting that in re-
sponse to CFTC regulation the Interbank Industry could shift the center of its foreign
currency trading overseas).
18. For a discussion of the role of the federal banking agencies and the SEC in
regulating the Interbank Industry, see infra part II.B.4-5.
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The long-standing tension between the Interbank Industry and the
CFTC has led to considerable litigation.19 Up to this point, most of
this litigation has focused on the meaning of the Treasury Amend-
ment's use of the term "transactions in foreign currency."' In 1986,
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. American Board of
Trade,2' the Second Circuit held that because an option merely grants
the right to engage in a future transaction, it is not technically a trans-
action "in" foreign currency until it is exercised, and therefore re-
mains subject to CFTC regulation.' Seven years later, that decision
was called into question in Salomon Forex, Inc v. Tauber where the
Fourth Circuit held that the Treasury Amendment exempts "all trans-
actions in which foreign currencies are the subject matter, including
options" from the CFTC's jurisdiction.'
Recently, in Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.'
the Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the American Board
of Trade and Salomon Forex decisions. Dunn arose when the CFTC
brought a complaint against William C. Dunn for allegedly defrauding
19. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that currency option transactions do not represent CEA exempt
"transactions in foreign currency" until they are exercised), rev'd, No. 95-1181, 1997
WL 75492, at *3 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997) (holding that currency option transactions
plainly represent CEA exempt "transactions in foreign currency"); Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that currency option transactions do not represent CEA exempt "transac-
tions in foreign currency" until they are exercised); Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8
F.3d 966, 976 (4th Cir. 1993), cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 1549, reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct. 2156
(1994) (holding that currency option transactions represent CEA exempt "transac-
tions in foreign currency"); Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1154
(7th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982) (holding that options on gov-
ernment securities do not represent CEA exempt "transactions" until they are exer-
cised); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,169, at 24,783-84 (NJ:. Ga.) (hold-
ing that options are not exempted "transactions in foreign currency"), modified on
other grounds, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 21,170
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
20. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, most courts
focused on the term "transactions in foreign currency" as the principal source of am-
biguity. See supra note 19. Recently, however, a conflict has emerged over the mean-
ing of the term "board of trade" as it is used in the Treasury Amendment. Compare
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993
WL 809966, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993) (holding that the term "board of trade"
encompasses any association of persons involved in the business of buying and selling
foreign currency) with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Frankwell Bullion
Ltd., 99 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the term "board of trade" means
only a formally organized exchange). For a discussion of Standard Forex and
Frankwell Bullion, see infra part IHL.A.2.
21. 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
22. IdL at 1248.
23. 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540, reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct.
2156 (1994).
24. 8 F.3d at 976.
25. No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
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the general public in connection with the sale of investment contracts
in various foreign currency options trading strategies.26 Relying on its
previous decision in American Board of Trade, the Second Circuit re-
iterated the rationale that "an option is not a transaction in foreign
currency until it is exercised," and allowed the CFTC to enjoin Dunn's
activities.27 In its consideration of Dunn, the Supreme Court rejected
that rationale as "wholly unpersuasive." According to the Court,
"as a matter of ordinary meaning," currency options plainly represent
transactions "'in' foreign currency for purposes of the 'reasury
Amendment. ' '19
Despite the Supreme Court's determination of Dunn, many issues
associated with the Treasury Amendment remain unresolved.
Although the Dunn Court put to rest the debate over the term "trans-
actions in foreign currency," the tension between the CFTC and the
Interbank Industry has resurfaced in the recently emerged conflict
over the meaning of the term "board of trade. '30 As noted above,
under the Treasury Amendment, "transactions in foreign currency"
remain subject to CFTC regulation if they involve a sale "for future
delivery conducted on a board of trade. '" 31 In 1993, in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Standard Forex, Inc. ,32 the Eastern
District of New York construed the term "board of trade" to include
not only organized exchanges designated as commodity markets by
the CFTC, but "any informal association of persons engaged in the
business of buying and selling" foreign currency.33 Under that ration-
ale, CFTC jurisdiction could be construed to extend to all foreign cur-
26. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *2; see also Dunn, 58 F.3d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1995)
(describing Dunn's activities). One commentator has argued that the CFrC should
never have been allowed to assert jurisdiction over the Dunn case in the first place:
Dunn's alleged fraud involved investors who had not traded currency but had instead
purchased investment contracts-securities governed by the securities laws.
Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 19. It is true that the definition of "security" in
both the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, includes the
phrase "investment contracts." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78(c)(10) (1994). In addition, the
Supreme Court has expressly classified "investment contracts" as securities subject to
the jurisdiction of the SEC. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). It
is far from clear, however, that the particular investment contracts at issue in Dunn
should have been subject to the securities laws. Indeed, in its determination of Dunn,
the Supreme Court declined to even address the issue of whether the investment con-
tracts involved could constitute securities. See Dunn, 1997 WL 75492. For a discussion
of whether the investment contracts at issue in Dunn could constitute securities see
infra note 212.
27. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 53-54 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Ameri-
can Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986)).
28. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *4.
29. Id at *3.
30. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
31. Id.
32. No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL 809966 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993). Standard Forex is
discussed more fully at infra part III.A.2.
33. Standard Forex, 1993 WL 809966, at *7.
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rency transactions, including those entered into by the Interbank
Industry.34 In 1996, the Standard Forex holding was expressly rejected
by the Ninth Circuit in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Frankwell Bullion Ltd.35 In Franklvell Bullion, the court interpreted
the term "'transactions conducted on a board of trade' to mean on-
exchange trades," thus concluding that the Treasury Amendment ex-
cludes "all off-exchange transactions in foreign currency" from CFTC
jurisdiction.36
This Note argues that the recent emergence of this new conflict,
which exposes the Interbank Industry to continued uncertainty over
the prospect of CFTC regulation, threatens to prolong the Treasury
Amendment controversy indefinitely.37 As such, despite the Supreme
Court's determination of Dunn, there remains an urgent need for leg-
islative action in this area. As one Congressman has recognized, un-
certainty over the scope of the Treasury Amendment has "created
numerous legal problems [which] the courts have dealt with inconsis-
tently. '3 8 To respond to these problems, Congress is currently consid-
ering a revision of the Treasury Amendment.39
This Note has two purposes. First, it reviews the background to the
Dunn decision and comments on the Supreme Court's determination
of the case. Second, this Note analyzes the larger controversy sur-
rounding the Treasury Amendment and suggests a regulatory frame-
work to resolve that controversy. Part I of this Note describes the
evolution of commodity option trading and its regulation. In particu-
lar, part I focuses on the repeated difficulties that have arisen with
regard to the regulation of options. Part I concludes by discussing the
background to the enactment of the Treasury Amendment and the
development of the competing CFTC and Industry interpretations of
it.
Part II of this Note reviews the principal cases on either side of the
controversy surrounding the Treasury Amendment's use of the term
"transactions in foreign currency." Although that controversy has
been resolved by the Supreme Court's ruling in Dunn, a dialectic of
34. Although the Standard Forex court's discussion of the meaning of the term
"board of trade" appears to suggest that the court understood it to encompass only
those informally organized associations involving sales to private unsophisticated in-
vestors, this Note argues that the court's basic rationale could provide for CFTC regu-
lation of the Interbank Industry. See id at *7-11. This point is discussed in greater
detail at supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
35. 99 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1996). The conflict between Franknvell Bullion and
Standard Forex is discussed more fully at infra note part IlI.A.2.
36. Frankwell Bullion, 99 F.3d at 304.
37. See supra note 34.
38. 142 Cong. Rec. E1897 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Thomas W.
Ewing). For cases which have interpreted the Treasury Amendment inconsistently,
see supra notes 19, 20.




the judiciary's struggles with the simple term "transactions in foreign
currency" remains useful as a framework for analyzing the Treasury
Amendment's shortcomings. In particular, part II asserts that the
American Board of Trade, Dunn and Salomon Forex decisions may be
comprehensibly synthesized under the legal realism theory of
jurisprudence.40
Through such a synthesis, part II asserts that courts have manipu-
lated the Treasury Amendment to compensate for the shortcomings of
what is a profoundly flawed statute. Those shortcomings, as the facts
underlying American Board of Trade, Dunn, and Salomon Forex
demonstrate, are a function of the Treasury Amendment's failure to
provide retail investors with the full protection of the CEA while si-
multaneously exempting the Interbank Industry from the threat of
CFTC regulation. In other words, the Treasury Amendment does not
adequately reconcile the legitimate interests of the CFTC with the
equally legitimate interests of the Industry. Part II concludes by argu-
ing that the recently emerged conflict between the Standard Forex and
Frankwell Bullion holdings, suggests that courts will continue to reach
strained readings of the Treasury Amendment in an effort to reconcile
those interests on a case by case basis. To borrow a reference from
another context, there will continue to be "decisions made on an ad
hoc basis, offering little predictive value" to a market that "demands
certainty and predictability."'" Thus, despite the Supreme Court's de-
termination of Dunn, there remains an urgent need for legislative re-
view of the Treasury Amendment.
As an alternative to the current Treasury Amendment, part III pro-
poses a revised regulatory regime. Part III reviews the Standard Forex
and Frankwell Bullion decisions and argues that the CFTC should be
able to protect unsophisticated individual investors from the system-
atic and fraudulent marketing of currency options. At the same time,
part III recognizes that for the Interbank Industry, supervision by the
federal banking agencies or the SEC, combined with the remedies
40. In essence, under the legal realism theory of jurisprudence, judges manipulate
legal rules to achieve what they perceive to be equitable results. G. Edward White,
The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 649, 651 (1984); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 153, 171 (1986)(noting that from the legal realist's perspective, courts look beyond the text of a stat-
ute or precedent to consider "the anticipated, economic, political, and social conse-
quences of the decision"); see, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950. Term
Foreword, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 107 (1951) (discussing the legal "realist" allegation
that the Supreme Court during President Roosevelt's tenure manipulated constitu-
tional doctrines and statutory interpretation to forward its program of social reform).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the application of the legal realism theory ofjurisprudence to the present inquiry see infra note 135.
41. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994) (comment-
ing on the negative effects of the uncertainty over aiding and abetting liability under
§ 10b of the Securities Act of 1934 as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (citations
omitted)).
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available under common law fraud and contract law are more than
adequate to sustain the integrity of the market. Thus, the Treasury
Amendment should be reformulated to incorporate a legal standard
that would provide retail participants with the complete protection of
the CEA while simultaneously providing a safe-harbor of maximum
legal certainty for the Interbank Industry. The Treasury Department
has proposed a revision of the Treasury Amendment which would es-
sentially achieve such a standard.42 Therefore, this Note advocates
that the Treasury Department's proposal should form the basis of any
new regulatory regime.
I. THE IsToRY OF COMMODITY OPrIONs AND FuTuREs
REGULATION
Futures contracts were first used in the United States by farmers
and agricultural merchants as protective mechanisms against fluctua-
tions in the price of agricultural commodities.4 3 In this context, a fu-
tures contract was quite simply a means to buy or sell a particular
commodity for future delivery and thereby eliminate any intervening
imbalance between supply and demand." In the first half of the nine-
teenth century, futures contracts were typically negotiated on an in-
formal basis between individual merchants and farmers.4" Gradually,
a more sophisticated market system evolved, culminating in the estab-
lishment of organized boards of trade in the 1840s.6
The first of these, the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT"), was
founded in 1848. 7 Although CBOT and other exchanges like it ini-
tially provided centralized markets on which standardized agricultural
commodities could be bought and sold for future delivery, the devel-
opment of standardized futures contracts also allowed investors to use
the contracts themselves as "a medium for trading and speculation."48
By the 1860s, commodity traders had also begun dealing in the
purchase or sale of "option contracts," which grant the purchaser the
42. The various proposed revisions of the Treasury Amendment, including the
Treasury Department's proposal, are discussed at infra part Ifl.C.
43. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357(1982). For a discussion of futures contracts see supra note 11.
44. Jonathan Lurie, The Chicago Board of Trade 1859-1905 24 (1979); see Peter L
Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 305-306 (1996).
45. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5853; see Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 357; Lurie, supra note 44, at
24-25; Jerry W. Markham, The History of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regu-
lation 4 (1987).
46. See Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 357-58; Lurie, supra note 44, at 24-25; Markham,
supra note 45, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Markham, supra note 45, at 4; see Lower, supra note 5 at 1099-1100.
2323
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular commodity at a fixed
price on a future date.49
From the outset, the use of options contracts on the commodities
markets was the source of tremendous controversy.50 Like "bucket
shops"-unsavory off-exchange establishments which literally allowed
patrons to gamble on commodity priceS51-options were popularly
perceived as "unnecessary to the functioning of the marketplace and
used only to place bets on expected price changes. 52 Many believed
that options trading "caused excessive speculation, took advantage of
small investors, and enriched speculators at the expense of farmers
and grain dealers. '53 Farmers, especially, complained that options
trading contributed to the devastating price fluctuations of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly when they were
used by speculators in attempts to "corner '54 the market in a particu-
lar commodity.55
Such sentiments led to a public outcry for legislative action that
reached a fever pitch when speculative abuses contributed to the pre-
cipitous drop in commodity prices at the end of World War J.56 Con-
gress responded in 1921 with the enactment of the Futures Trading
Act (the "FrA"). 57 Among other things, the FTA attempted to eradi-
cate what were contemporarily perceived to be the primary sources of
speculative abuse.58 First, in an effort to control futures trading, and
eliminate price manipulation and bucketing, the FTA imposed a pro-
hibitive tax on grain futures which were not executed on an exchange
licensed and supervised as a "contract market" by the Secretary of
Agriculture.59 Second, in an attempt to legislate options out of exist-
49. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03; see Lower, supra note 5, at 1099; Markham, supra
note 45, at 8. In the contemporary nomenclature such contracts were called "privi-
leges." Id For a more comprehensive explanation of option contracts see supra note
5.
50. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03; Lower, supra note 5, at 1099.
51. Markham, supra note 45, at 9.
52. Lower, supra note 5, at 1099; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
53. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03; accord Lower, supra note 5, at 1099.
54. To "comer" the market means to purchase all the available supply of a partic-
ular commodity with the purpose of controlling the price available to subsequent buy-
ers. Jennings et al., supra note 5, at 8.
55. Markham, supra note 45, at 5; see S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 12-13,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5854. During this period, regulating options
through federal legislation was frequently considered by Congress. However,
"[b]ecause of their inability to distinguish between the options that farmers sought to
ban and the futures contracts that the exchanges fought hard to protect, the legislators
several times failed to enact any sort of regulation." Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
56. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5855; Markham, supra note 45, at 9-12; see Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
57. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921); see Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
58. Markham, supra note 45, at 12; Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
59. Markham, supra note 45, at 12; see Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
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ence, the FTA imposed a prohibitive tax on options regardless of
where they were traded.'
In the 1922 case, Hill v. Wallace,6' the Supreme Court ruled that the
FTA's tax on off-exchange grain futures transactions represented an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's taxing power.6 Congress re-
acted promptly by enacting the Grain Futures Act of 1922, which re-
lied on the Commerce Clause to prohibit all futures transactions not
executed on a designated contract market.63 In 1923, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Grain Futures Act,6 4 thus
approving the basis for the federal regulation of the commodities mar-
kets that continues to this day.65
Meanwhile, the FTA's options tax, which had not been at issue in
Hill,' had survived and constructively prohibited options trading until
the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional in 1926.67 Immediately
thereafter, option trading reappeared with renewed popularity.68
A. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936
In 1933, speculative trading, particularly in options, was again be-
lieved to have led to a devastating collapse in commodity prices and
President Roosevelt called for a comprehensive review of commodity
market regulation.69 Congress responded by enacting the CEA of
1936 as the successor to both the Futures Trading Act of 1921 and the
Grain Futures Act of 1922.70 Primarily, the new Act established regu-
latory standards for commodity market transactions in certain specifi-
cally enumerated commodities.71 In addition, the Act added criminal
sanctions for actual or attempted manipulation of commodity prices. 2
Finally, because many believed that options trading had played a sig-
60. Lower, supra note 5, at 1100; see Markham, supra note 45, at 12.
61. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
62. Id. at 68-69; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 361 (1982).
63. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 361.
64. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
65. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5843; Lurie, supra note 44, at 211; Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
66. 259 U.S. at 71-72.
67. Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926); see Lower, supra note 5, at 1100.
68. Lower, supra note 5, at 1101 (noting that, "[a]s with most activity in the Roar-
ing Twenties, option trading was frenetic," and that wheat options transactions repre-
sented an estimated 15% of the volume of trading done in wheat on CBOT).
69. See Markham, supra note 45, at 24-25 (quoting President Roosevelt's February
9, 1934 letter to Congress).
70. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26).
71. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) ("The word
'commodity' shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain
sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs and solanrum tuberosum (Irish potatoes)."); accord
Lower, supra note 5, at 1102 n.28.
72. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 9, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); Lower, supra
note 5, at 1102.
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nificant role in the 1933 collapse, trading in options on the commodi-
ties covered by the new Act was banned altogether.73
With the exception of periodic amendments to add various new
commodities to those already regulated under the original Act, the
CEA stood essentially undisturbed for the next thirty-five years.74
During that period, commodity option trading in the United States
was virtually non-existent.75 In 1970, however, "a keen interest in
commodity options resurfaced. ' 76
In the sixties, a very active trading market had developed in so-
called "world commodities"-a category which included things like
silver, platinum, coffee, and sugar.77 A number of U.S. firms were
keen to take advantage of opportunities presented by that market and
"quickly discovered that there was a gap in the coverage of the Com-
modity Exchange Act ban on options. '7 8 Because the Act only
banned options trading on certain specifically enumerated domestic
commodities, 79 options on the so-called "world commodities" re-
mained unregulated and could legally be sold to the American pub-
lic.80 Because of their unregulated nature, these options quickly
became instruments of fraud and abuse, presenting substantial risks
for the investors involved."' Nevertheless, because of their apparently
lucrative nature, as well as the explosive growth in commodity trading
generally, interest in these options blossomed and ultimately "cost in-
nocent investors many millions of dollars." 8 These developments
came to the attention of Congress and ultimately led to a new set of
regulations.8 3
B. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1974
In response to the continued growth in size and complexity of the
commodities markets in the early seventies, as well as the fraudulent
use of options,84 Congress substantially amended the CEA in 1974
73. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, sec. 5, § 4c(B), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (cur-
rent version at 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1994)).
74. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5855; Lower, supra note 5, at 1102; Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
75. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
76. Lower, supra note 5, at 1102; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
77. Lower, supra note 5, at 1102-03; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
78. Lower, supra note 5, at 1103; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03.
79. See supra note 71.
80. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03; Lower, supra note 5, at 1103; see S. Rep. No. 93-
1131, supra note 45, at 23-24, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5864.
81. Lower, supra note 5, at 1102.
82. Snider, supra note 16, § 7.03; see Lower, supra note 5, at 1102-09.
83. See British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 485 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977) (noting that "[i]ntimations of difficulties in the
commodity options market came to the attention of Congress in the early 1970's").
84. 2 Thomas A. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Mar-
kets, at § 19.07 (1995).
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("the 1974 Act").85 The 1974 Act, like its predecessor, retained the
requirement that all types of commodity futures contracts and most
types of commodity options be traded on designated commodity ex-
changes unless exempted by the CFTC.86 Among other things, the
1974 Act also closed the loophole for the so-called world commodi-
ties.' While the CEA had previously applied only to futures and op-
tions trading in specifically enumerated domestic agricultural
products, the 1974 Act significantly broadened the scope of the com-
modity contracts that were subject to regulation." The amendments
broadly redefined "a commodity" to include "all services, rights, and
interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in.,8 9
In addition, to replace the Secretary of Agriculture, who had previ-
ously overseen the administration of the CEA, Congress created a
new independent agency, the CFTC,90 and entrusted to it sweeping
authority to implement the CEA.91 The CFTC was granted exclusive
jurisdiction over commodity futures, contracts and various other com-
modity-related activities, including options trading.92 The 1974 Act
maintained the ban on options trading involving commodities specifi-
cally enumerated prior to 1974, but also gave the CFTC authority to
85. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26; see Markham, supra note 45, at 60-72.
86. 1 Thomas Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets,
§ 1.01 (1994); see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.04.
87. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5859:
While the futures markets in a number of agricultural commodities have
been regulated in varying degrees since 1922, many large and important fu-
tures markets are completely unregulated by the Federal Government.
These include ... markets in a number of foreign currencies. A person trad-
ing in one of the currently unregulated futures markets should receive the
same protection afforded to those trading in the regulated markets.
Id. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the loophole for
world commodities.
88. Russo, supra note 86, § 1.01; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.04.
89. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(3) (1994).
90. See Russo, supra note 84, § 19.07 (noting that to protect against price manipu-
lation and fraud, "Congress thought it necessary to 'establish a regulatory authority in
the commodities field similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission'" (internal
citations omitted)).
91. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 366 (1982); Mark-
ham, supra note 45 at 60-72.
92. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). This section provides in pertinent part:
The [CFrC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction... with respect to accounts,
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is com-
monly known to the trade as, an "option"... ), and transactions involving
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market.
Id.; see Snider, supra note 16, § 7.04.
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regulate or ban options trading involving commodities covered by the
new Act.9
3
C. The Treasury Amendment
In the years preceding the 1974 amendments, a large off-exchange
foreign currency market had developed among various commercial
banks, multi-national corporations and sophisticated investors.94 This
market, which came to be known as the interbank market, was con-
ducted through privately negotiated transactions off any formal ex-
change and was used for both risk management and speculative
purposes.95 While the 1974 amendments were being considered, the
Department of Treasury became concerned that the CEA's broad
grant of authority to the CFrC, together with its expansive definition
of commodity, could subject the sophisticated foreign currency market
to new and unnecessary regulation.9 6 The Treasury Department ex-
plained these concerns in a letter to the Senate Committee consider-
ing the 1974 amendments. That letter stated in pertinent part:
The Department believes the bills contain an ambiguity that
should be clarified. The provisions of the bills do not clearly indi-
cate that the new regulatory agency's authority would be limited to
the regulation of futures trading on organized exchanges and would
not extend to futures trading in foreign currencies off organized ex-
changes. We do not believe that either the House of Representa-
tives or your Committee intends the proposed legislation [the CEA]
to subject the foreign currency futures trading of banks or other in-
stitutions, other than on an organized exchange, to the new regula-
tory regime.
The Department feels strongly that foreign currency futures trad-
ing, other than on organized exchanges, should not be regulated by
the new agency. Virtually all futures trading in foreign currencies in
the United States is carried out though an informal network of
banks and dealers. This dealer market, which consists primarily of
the large banks, has proved highly efficient in serving the needs of
international business in hedging the risks that stem from foreign
exchange rate movements. The participants in this market are so-
phisticated and informed institutions, unlike the participants on or-
ganized exchanges, which, in some cases, include individuals and
small traders who mayneed to be protected by some form of gov-
ernmental regulation.'
93. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (b) (1994); Snider, supra note 16, § 7.04.
94. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 49-50, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5887-88.
95. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 3-4.
96. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 49-51, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5887-88.
97. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 49-50, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5887-88 (emphasis in original).
2328 [Vol. 65
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
The Treasury Department's principal concern was that the new regu-
latory requirements would adversely affect "the usefulness and effi-
ciency of foreign exchange markets."98 Rather than subjecting the
foreign exchange market to the jurisdiction of the newly created
CFTC, the Treasury suggested that Congress look to traditional bank
regulators to fulfill that role:99
Where the need for regulation of transactions on other than organ-
ized exchanges does exist, this should be done through strengthen-
ing existing regulatory responsibilities now lodged in the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve. These agen-
cies are currently taking action to achieve closer supervision of the
trading risks involved in these activities. 10°
Fmally, the Treasury expressed doubt about the newly created CFTC's
ability to regulate the foreign exchange market, and articulated its
concern that such regulation could impair market efficiency:10'
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission would clearly not
have the expertise to regulate a complex banking function and
would confuse an already highly regulated business sector. More-
over, in this context, new regulatory limitations and restrictions
could have an adverse impact on the usefulness and efficiency of
foreign exchange markets for traders and investors.102
To address these concerns, the Treasury Department suggested an
amendment to the 1974 Act which would exclude the interbank mar-
ket from CFTC jurisdiction. 10 3 Congress responded by incorporating
almost"° all of Treasury's proposed language into the text of the new
Act in what is now commonly known as the Treasury Amendment:
Nothing in this chapter [the CEA] shall be deemed to govern or in
any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security
warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repur-
chase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage
purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale
thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of tradeY°5
98. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5888.
99. See Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 31.
100. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5888.
101. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 32.
102. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5888.
103. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 51, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5849.
104. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 972 nA (4th Cir. 1993) ("The
sole change Congress made in the amendment was that whereas the Treasury's ver-
sion would have excluded from CEA regulation 'puts and calls for securities,' these
were not excluded under the enacted version.").
105. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
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Senate Committee discussion of the Treasury Amendment demon-
strates that sensitivity to the Treasury's fears of CFTC jurisdiction was
the primary motivation for its enactment:
[T]he Committee included an amendment to clarify that the provi-
sions of the bill are not applicable to trading in foreign currencies
and certain enumerated financial instruments unless such trading is
conducted on a formally organized futures exchange. A great deal
of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried out
through an informal network of banks and tellers. The Committee
believes that this market is more properly supervised by the bank
regulatory agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this legis-
lation is unnecessary.1°6
1. Status of Commodity Option Trading After the 1974 Act
As noted above, with the enactment of the 1974 Act, options trans-
actions in CEA regulated commodities were not banned outright but
were subject to regulation or prohibition by the CFTC.10 7 For a pe-
riod, the CFTC allowed commodity option trading to continue with
some regulatory restrictions. 08 By 1978, however, several highly pub-
licized option trading scandals had prompted the Commission to con-
clude that "the offer and sale of commodity options has for some time
been and remains permeated with fraud and other illegal or unsound
practices."'0 9 As a result, in 1978 the CFTC adopted a regulation gen-
erally banning transactions in commodity options." 0 Congress codi-
fied that regulation later that year, but sustained CFTC authority to
adopt regulations exempting options."' The CFTC would later exer-
cise this exemptive authority by adopting the Trade Option Exemp-
106. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 23, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5863. "'Traders' rather than 'tellers' would seem to have been intended from the
context." Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 976 n.6.
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
108. See 43 Fed. Reg. 16153, 16155 (Apr. 17, 1978); Snider, supra note 16, § 7.04.
109. 43 Fed. Reg. 16153, 16155 (Apr. 17, 1978); see British Am. Commodity Op-
tions Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 486-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1996) ("[I]t shall be unlawful... until further rule, regula-
tion or order of the Commission, for any person to solicit or accept orders for.., the
purchase or sale of any commodity option, or to supervise any person or persons so
engaged.")
111. See 7. U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1994), which provides in pertinent part:
No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execution of,
any transaction involving any commodity regulated under this chapter which
is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an "option" ...
contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any
such transaction ....
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tion,n 2 and the Exemption of Swap'13 Agreements (the "Swaps
Exemption")." 4
2. The Development of Competing Interpretations of the Treasury
Amendment
As noted above, the Treasury Amendment excludes from CFrC ju-
risdiction and thus from the CEA's general ban on options, "transac-
tions in" a list of enumerated commodities, including foreign currency,
unless those transactions are conducted on a "board of trade.""' In a
1977 interpretive letter, the CFTC articulated its position that the
Treasury Amendment's exclusion hinged not only on whether a de-
ferred delivery transaction was conducted on a "board of trade," but
also on the relative sophistication of the participants to that transac-
tion." 6 Referring to the Senate Committee's discussion of the CEA,
the 1977 interpretive letter stated:
We view these remarks by the Committee as an expression that reg-
ulation by the Commission is unnecessary where there exists an in-
formal market among institutional participants in transactions for
future delivery in the specified financial instruments only so long as
it is supervised by those agencies having regulatory responsibility
over those participants. However, where that market is not super-
vised and where those transactions are conducted with participation
by members of the general public, we do not understand the Com-
mittee to have intended that a regulatory gap should exist. In these
circumstances, we believe the Commodity Exchange Act should be
construed broadly to assure that the public interest will be protected
by Commission regulation of those transactions.' 7
In the eight years which followed the 1977 interpretative letter, the
interbank market in various currency derivatives began to evolve.' 8
In particular, the interbank market in currency options-which prior
to 1982 had been virtually non-existent-grew rapidly." 9 Concerned
by these developments, in 1985 the CFTC issued an interpretation of
the Treasury Amendment which essentially reiterated the basic thrust
112. Id. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a) (1996). For a discussion of the Trade Option Exemp-
tion see infra part II.B.3.a.
113. As its name suggests, a swap contract obligates two parties to exchange a se-
ries of cash flows at specified intervals known as payment or settlement dates. The
cash flows are either fixed, or calculated for each settlement date by multiplying the
quantity of the notional principal by specified reference rates or prices. Downes &
Goodman, supra note 5, at 576; Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 31.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1996). For a discussion of the Swaps Exemption see infra
part m.B.3.b.
115. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
116. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,467, at 21,909
(Aug. 17, 1977).
117. Id.
118. See Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 7, 18.
119. Id. at 18.
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of its 1977 letter.12  The 1985 release stated that "the Treasury
Amendment cannot be read so as to place outside the Commission's
jurisdiction the marketing to the general public of such off-exchange
foreign currency transactions; instead the Amendment was meant to
encompass only transactions among and between banks and other so-
phisticated, informed institutions."' 2'1 The release requested comment
on what persons should "qualify as 'sophisticated and informed insti-
tution[s]' permitted to participate in this market.' ' 2 2
The Treasury Department, various financial institutions, and several
law firms all criticized the CFTC's 1985 interpretive release as a seri-
ous misreading of the Treasury Amendment. 23 To them, the term
"transactions in foreign currency" plainly excluded both off-exchange
futures and options transactions from CFTC jurisdiction. 1 4 In a 1986
letter, the Treasury Department argued that, "[b]y its terms, the Treas-
ury Amendment exemption is a transactional one that places outside
the coverage of the Act all off-exchange futures transactions in the
listed financial instruments.... [It] contains no language limiting the
coverage of the exemption based upon the characteristics of partici-
pants in a transaction."' 5 In the Treasury's view, the CFTC's inter-
pretation of the Treasury Amendment was "not consistent with the
plain meaning of the statute.' 26
As the Supreme Court would subsequently determine in Dunn, at
least with regard to the meaning of the discrete term "transactions in
foreign currency," the Treasury Department's view of the Treasury
Amendment was correct. 27 Indeed, the Dunn Court would summa-
rily dismiss the CFTC's reading of the term "transactions in foreign
currency" as "wholly unpersuasive."'2 Nevertheless, in the years be-
120. CFTC Interpretative Letter, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 (Oct. 23, 1985).
121. Id at 42,984.
122. Idt at 42,985 n.13.
123. See Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 36.
124. See id.
125. Letter from Charles 0. Sethness, Assistant Secretary, Department of the
Treasury, to Susan M. Phillips, Chairman, CFTC 1 (May 5, 1986), quoted in Commit-
tee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 36.
126. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 36. In addition to its
desire to protect the efficiency of the domestic currency market, the Treasury was also
concerned that the CFrC might take a similar position with respect to government
securities markets, which are also excluded from CFTC jurisdiction by the Treasury
Amendment. Id. at 38.
127. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL
75492, at *3 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997). However, as discussed below, in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL 809966
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993), the court articulated an interpretation of the Treasury
Amendment's use of the term "board of trade" which essentially applied a test based
on the nature of the participants to a transaction. Id. at *7, *11 (holding that the term
"board of trade" includes any association of persons engaged in the business of selling
currency contracts to unsophisticated investors). For a discussion of the Standard
Forex holding see infra part III.A.2.
128. 1997 WL 75492, at *4.
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tween the Commission's 1985 interpretative release and the Supreme
Court's determination of Dunn, the Commission would feel suffi-
ciently confident in its reading of the Treasury Amendment to test its
validity through litigation. Interestingly, as part H discusses, in many
circumstances courts would defer to that reading despite its "wholly
unpersuasive" nature.
II. THE SuPREME COURT'S DECISION IN DUNN AND A SYNTHESIS
OF AMERICAN BOARD OF TRADE, SALOMON FOREX, AND
DUNA. REVEALING THE FLAWs IN THE
TREASURY AMENDMENT
In 1997, in Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,'2 9 the
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that currency options plainly
represent "transactions in foreign currency" and are therefore ex-
cluded from CFTC jurisdiction by the Treasury Amendment. 3 ' As
noted above, the Dunn holding put to rest the long standing tension
between two lower court interpretations of the Treasury Amendment.
In 1986, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. American
Board of Trade,3' the Second Circuit had held that because an option
merely grants the holder the right to engage in a future transaction, it
is not technically a transaction "in" foreign currency until it is exer-
cised, and therefore remains subject to CFTC regulation. 3' In 1993,
that decision was called into question in Salomon Forex, Inc. v.
Tauber,'33 where the Fourth Circuit held that the Treasury Amend-
ment excludes "all transactions in which foreign currencies are the
subject matter, including options" from the CEA.'1
This part reviews the American Board of Trade, Salomon Forex, and
Dunn decisions. Although the controversy underlying these cases has
been resolved by the Supreme Court's ruling in Dunn, a dialectic of
the judiciary's struggles with the simple term "transactions in foreign
currency" remains useful as a framework for analyzing the Treasury
Amendment's flaws. In particular, this part asserts that the American
Board of Trade, Salomon Forex, and Dunn decisions may be compre-
hensibly synthesized under the legal realism theory of jurispru-
dence. 135 Through such a synthesis this part asserts that courts have
129. No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
130. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *3-4.
131. 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1248.
133. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540, reh'g
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2156 (1994).
134. 8 F.3d at 976.
135. For a general discussion of the legal realism theory of jurisprudence see Rich-
ard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179 (1987). In that article, Judge Posner
analogizes statutes-that for various reasons including the "passage of time and
change of circumstance" have been interpreted inconsistently-to garbled battlefield
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manipulated the Treasury Amendment to compensate for the short-
comings of what is a profoundly flawed statute. Thus, this part's focus
extends beyond the judiciary's struggles with the term "transactions in
foreign currency" and into a discussion of the Treasury Amendment's
inefficacy as a statutory tool for the regulation of contemporary cur-
rency markets. That inefficacy, as the facts underlying American
Board of Trade, Salomon Forex, and Dunn demonstrate, is a function
of the Treasury Amendment's failure to provide unsophisticated retail
investors with the full protection of the CEA while simultaneously
exempting the Interbank Industry from the threat of CFTC regula-
tion. In other words, the Treasury Amendment does not adequately
reconcile the legitimate interests of the Industry with the equally legit-
imate interests of the CFTC. This part concludes by arguing that the
recently emerged conflict between the Standard Forex and Frankwell
Bullion holdings suggests that courts will continue to reach strained
readings of the Treasury Amendment in an effort to reconcile those
interests on an ad hoc basis. Such decisions are inherently unpredict-
able and do not address the interbank market's need for legal cer-
tainty. Thus, despite the Supreme Court's determination of Dunn,
there remains an urgent need for legislative review of the Treasury
Amendment.
A. The Second Circuit's Decision in American Board of Trade
Some background is necessary to understand the origins of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. American Board of
Trade'36 decision. The case revolved around an entity calling itself the
American Board of Trade ("ABT"), organized by a Mr. Arthur Econ-
omou. 1 37  In addition to running a commodity trading operation
(which was ultimately the source of the CFI'C's suit), ABT's principal
communications, and argues that the duty of the judicial recipients of such communi-
cations is to advance, taking into account relevant policy considerations, the enter-
prise set on foot by their commanders, the legislators. Id. at 189. Under this Note's
argument, Judge Posner's analogy would seem particularly appropriate to the contro-
versy surrounding the Treasury Amendment. Due to the "passage of time and change
in circumstance"-namely the development since 1974 of the interbank market in
currency options-the Treasury Amendment as a statute, and as a communication,
has become susceptible to inconsistent interpretation. As a consequence, where equi-
table maxims like "no person shall profit from his own wrongdoing" have applied,
courts have often put an interpretative gloss on the Treasury Amendment in order to
achieve equitable results. Id. at 181 (citing Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 23-24 (1967)). In other words, courts have reached strained
readings of the Treasury Amendment, in order to do, as Judge Posner would say, the
"best [they] can," irrespective of its limitations. Id. at 179. This Note argues that this
approach is an inappropriate methodology for market regulation and that the judici-
ary's struggles with the Treasury Amendment highlight the necessity of revising it to
reflect the prevailing characteristics of the current interbank market.
136. 473 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 803 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. at 1178.
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business was selling unregistered commercial paper'38 to unsophistica-
ted retail consumers, with the promise that the proceeds would be
used to finance the establishment of a successor to the commodity and
stock exchanges of Chicago and New York.1 39 ABT ultimately de-
faulted on its commercial paper obligations, leaving 9,100 investors of
mostly modest means with losses of over sixty cents on the dollar. 40
With that background as perspective, it should not be surprising
that ABT and the CFTC ended up in court over the validity of ABT's
commodity business. The origins of the case can be traced back to
1975, when ABT applied to the CFTC to request that it be provision-
ally designated as an official "contract market" authorized to conduct
commodity transactions for future delivery.14" ' The CFTC denied this
application after a preliminary inquiry revealed that in addition to us-
ing unique trading practices of "uncertain impact," Mr. Economou's
purported commodity exchange did not in fact have an exchange
floor, and appeared to be nothing more then Mr. Economou himself,
his wife, and the companies controlled by him.'42
Nevertheless, ABT apparently began to operate as an "exchange
and marketplace" engaged in the sale of a variety of commodity prod-
ucts, including foreign currency options.143 In the process, ABT col-
lected premiums and other proceeds totaling an estimated $5.1 million
from members of the general public.'" In 1979, the CFTC brought
suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging, inter alia, that
ABT's sales of currency options violated the CEA, and seeking an
injunction to enjoin ABT from continuing its option business. 45 With
138. In general, the term "commercial paper" refers to short-term unsecured prom-
issory notes which corporations use to raise funds in the money market. Although
commercial paper is considered a security for purposes of the federal securities laws,
it is exempt from the registration requirements of those laws. Jennings et al, supra
note 5, at 6 n.10 (citing § 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933).
139. William Power, American Board of Trade Ordered to Be Liquidated, Wall St.
J., Feb. 3, 1987, at 50.
140. Id.
141. American Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. Bagley, 402 F. Supp. 974, 976-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The CEA makes it unlawful for any person to engage in commodity transac-
tions for future delivery except through members of a 'board of trade' that has been
designated by the CFrC as a "contract market." 7 U.S.C. § 6. The CFTC is author-
ized and directed under section 5 of the CEA to grant designation as a "contract
market," "when, and only when," an applicant "contract market" has met the condi-
tions specified by the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1994). Included in these conditions is the
requirement that the CFTC "expressly finds" that the contracts the applicant "con-
tract market" intends to trade in "shall not be readily susceptible to manipulation." 7
U.S.C. §2a(ii)(ll) (1994).
142. Bagley, 402 F. Supp. at 977.
143. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d
1242, 1244, 1246 (2d Cir. 1986).
144. Id. at 1245-46.
145. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp.
1177, 1177-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 803 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1986). Specifically,
the CFTC's complaint alleged that ABT's transactions violated its regulatory ban on
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respect to ABT's currency option transactions, Economou argued,
courtesy of the Treasury Amendment, that foreign currency options
transactions were exempt from regulation under the CEA.146
The district court rejected this contention. The court reasoned that
a "transaction in foreign currency and a transaction in options involv-
ing foreign currency are different animals."' 47 According to the court,
an "option to purchase or sell a commodity is not a transaction in that
commodity:"' 14 8
The option transaction is a long step removed from a transaction in
the commodity involved, since the option purchaser, if he or she
does nothing more when the specified date arrives, will simply see
the option die. If, when the exercise date arrives, the option holder
decides to exercise the option, he or she at that point, and not
before, will engage in a transaction in the commodity involved.' 49
Under this rationale, the court determined that ABT's transactions in
currency options were not exempt from CFTC jurisdiction and were
therefore illegal under the CEA.15 ° In fashioning relief, the court not
only enjoined ABT from engaging in any further commodity option
transactions, but also ordered it to disgorge $126,706 "to make whole
those members of thepublic who lost money through the purchase of
commodity options."' 1
In a 1986 decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court,
dismissing as without merit ABT's contention that its foreign currency
options transactions were excluded from CFTC regulation by the
Treasury Amendment. 5 2 In a brief analysis, the Second Circuit reiter-
ated the district court's rationale that an option "does not become a
'transaction[ ] in' that currency unless and until the option is exer-
cised," and thus concluded that under the Treasury Amendment,
ABT's currency option transactions remained subject to CFTC
regulation. 53
options under 17 C.F.R. § 32.11, and codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b). See supra notes 110-
11 and accompanying text.
146. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. at 1181.
147. Id at 1182.
148. Id
149. Id. at 1183.
150. Id
151. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d
1242, 1244, 1246 (2d Cir. 1986).
152. Id at 1248.
153. Id (citing American Board of Trade, 473 F. Supp. at 1182). The court also
cited Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1154 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated
as moot, 459 U.S. 1026, 1054, 1055 n.34 (1982) (holding that options on government
securities also covered by the Treasury Amendment, were not "transactions in ...
government securities" because "[o]nly when the option holder exercises the option is
there a transaction in a government security," but noting that "[w]e draw no conclu-
sion as to whether the Treasury amendment affects any CFTC jurisdiction over op-
tions on foreign currency.").
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As the Supreme Court determined in Dunn, the analysis articulated
by the American Board of Trade court was simply implausible."5 De-
spite the analytical flaws of the American Board of Trade decision,
however, a strong argument can be made that the result reached was
equitable. It should be remembered that Mr. Economou's commer-
cial paper business ultimately left thousands of small retail investors
with losses of over sixty cents on the dollar.' 5- If the Second Circuit
had not found-albeit through a "wholly unpersuasive" reading of the
Treasury Amendment' 5 6-that Mr. Economou's currency option
transactions were subject to CFTC jurisdiction-thousands more re-
tail investors may have incurred substantial losses through his com-
modities business. Thus, by its literal terms the Treasury
Amendment's does not allow courts to protect unsophisticated retail
investors from potential fraud.
Ironically, since the American Board of Trade decision the negative
consequences associated with the Treasury Amendment's limited flex-
ibility have been most apparent in their effect on the Interbank Indus-
try. Although the American Board of Trade rationale allowed for an
equitable result, it had the unfortunate collateral effect of casting un-
certainty over the enforceability of the $20 billion worth of foreign
currency option contracts that are traded on a daily basis on the do-
mestic interbank market.157 Because the Second Circuit determined
that such options did not enjoy the Treasury Amendment's exclusion
from CFTC regulation, they were, until the Supreme Court's decision
154. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1997 WIL 75492,
at *4 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
155. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *4.
157. See Central Bank Survey of Derivatives Markets Activity Results of the Sur-
vey in the United States, at Annex II, tbL 5-U.S. (Dec. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Central
Bank Survey].
The uncertainty created by the American Board of Trade rationale is conspicuously
apparent in both the Foreign Exchange and Options Master Agreement ("FEOMA")
and the International Currency Options Market Master Agreement ("ICOM"), the
master agreement contracts utilized by counterparties to option transactions in the
interbank market. See FEOMA and ICOM (reprinted in The Foreign Exchange Com-
mittee, Annual Report 55-115 (1995)) [hereinafter FX Annual Report]. Significantly,
ICOM's Guide, which was written prior to the Supreme Court's determination of
Dunn, discusses at some length the background to the Treasury Amendment's enact-
ment and the uncertainty created by the Second Circuit's interpretation of it. Id. at
99-100. Such direct recognition of the uncertainties created by the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Treasury Amendment would seem to indicate that the Interbank
Industry had to cater and adapt to them. This, in turn, suggests that the uncertainties
may have had an inhibiting influence on the growth and efficiency of the interbank
market. For a discussion of the effects of such uncertainties see infra part MII.
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in Dunn,'58 technically unenforceable as illegal contracts made in vio-
lation of the CEA. 59
B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision in Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber
In 1993, in Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 61 the Interbank Industry
was confronted with the threat of unenforceability created by the
American Board of Trade rationale. The Salomon Forex case arose
from a private debt collection action brought by Salomon Forex Inc., a
foreign currency brokerage company and interbank market partici-
pant, against one if its customers who refused to pay more than $25
million in trading losses.161
The customer, Dr. Laszlo Tauber, was as the district court re-
marked, "by all accounts an unusual person." 62 In addition to being a
physician with an active medical practice, he was also "a major real
estate investor" and "a sophisticated foreign currency trader," with an
estimated net worth of over $500 million.' 63 From 1987 to 1991,
Tauber and Salomon Forex engaged in a series of over 2500 OTC cur-
rency transactions. 64 In 1991, the value of Tauber's investments de-
clined sharply and Salomon billed him for the almost $26 million that
had come due under sixty-eight futures and option contracts. 65 When
Tauber refused to pay, Salomon brought a diversity suit to enforce the
debt in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 66
Relying expressly on the American Board of Trade rationale,
Tauber's principal argument was that his debts were unenforceable
because they arose from off-exchange futures and options transactions
executed in violation of the CEA. 67 He contended that the reasury
Amendment applied only to transactions in the actual commodity,
"spot," and "forward" transactions-all transactions in which physical
delivery of the commodity itself is anticipated.168 Rejecting this argu-
158. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL
75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
159. This possibility was particularly disturbing under the rationale employed by
the American Board of Trade court-which cut off CFTC jurisdiction when an option
is exercised-thus making the Commission's potential jurisdiction as unpredictable as
the market forces of which it was a function. As one commentator has noted "[ilt is
hard to find a compelling public policy purpose behind such an anomalous result."
Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20. For an explanation of the conditions under
which an option becomes profitable see supra note 5.
160. 795 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
161. Salomon Forex, 795 F. Supp. at 769.
162. Id
163. Id at 769-70.
164. Idt at 770; 8 F.3d at 969.
165. 795 F. Supp. at 771.
166. Idt at 769, 771.
167. 8 F.3d at 973.
168. Id For a description of spot and forward transactions see supra notes 10-11.
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ment, the district court held that Tauber's trading debts were enforce-
able, because the Treasury Amendment's reference to "transactions in
foreign currency" plainly exempted OTC currency options transac-
tions from the CEA.'6 9
In a unanimous decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court, holding that the Treasury Amendment's "broad and unquali-
fied" exemption for "transactions in foreign currency" clearly in-
cluded "options transactions."'170 Central to the court's analysis was
the Treasury Amendment's "unless" clause (the "board of trade pro-
viso"). 7' The board of trade proviso sweeps back within CEA cover-
age those transactions involving sales "for future delivery conducted
on a board of trade."" z The court reasoned that "[i]f Congress meant
for the clause 'transactions in foreign currency' to apply only to trans-
actions in the commodity itself, it would have no reason to exclude
futures transactions conducted on an exchange."'1 73 Indeed, in order
to have meaning, "[t]he class of transactions covered by the general
clause 'transactions in foreign currency' must include a larger class
than those removed from it" by the board of trade proviso.74 Thus,
because the board of trade proviso specifically refers to futures trans-
actions conducted on an exchange, "the general clause 'transactions in
foreign currency"' must include off-exchange or OTC futures transac-
tions. 175 From there, the court pointed out that there is no principled
reason to distinguish OTC currency futures from OTC currency op-
tions-both are deferred delivery transactions with the same subject
matter, namely foreign currency. 176 Therefore, the court concluded
that the Treasury Amendment applies not only to "transactions in the
commodity itself," but to "all transactions in which foreign currency is
the subject matter, including options."'"
As the Supreme Court would subsequently confirm in its determi-
nation of Dunn, the analysis employed by the Salomon Forex court
169. 795 F. Supp. at 773.
170. 8 F.3d at 975.
171. Id. The Treasury Amendment's board of trade proviso begins with "unless":
"Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in foreign currency... unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for
future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (emphasis added).
172. 8 F.3d at 975 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The court's use of the term "futures" in this context is somewhat confus-
ing. In a technical sense, off-exchange or OTC "futures" do not exist as such-they
are labeled in industry nomenclature "forwards." See supra note 11. The court may
have favored the term "futures" because that is the term which corresponds to the
board of trade proviso's phrase "for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." 7
U.S.C. § 2(ii) (emphasis added); see Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768,
770 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the inconsis-
tent use of the futures/forwards nomenclature).




was correct. 178 Moreover, by enforcing Dr. Tauber's perfectly legiti-
mate debts, the Salomon Forex court also reached a result which was
both fair and responsive to Industry concerns over unenforceability.
Notwithstanding that result, however, the Salomon Forex court
seems to have appreciated the equitable considerations which had in-
fluenced the Second Circuit in American Board of Trade.179 That ap-
preciation apparently prompted the Fourth Circuit to introduce an
element of inconsistency into its opinion. As noted above, after a
lengthy discussion of the text of the Treasury Amendment, the Fourth
Circuit concluded in Salomon Forex that "[w]e are thus satisfied that
under the appropriate interpretation of the Treasury Amendment, all
off-exchange transactions in foreign currency, including futures and op-
tions, are exempted from regulation by the CEA.'18 0 In stark contrast
to that conclusion, after discussing the legislative history of the Treas-
ury Amendment and the American Board of Trade opinion the Fourth
Circuit stated: "We hold only that individually-negotiated foreign cur-
rency options and futures transactions between sophisticated, large-
scale foreign currency traders fall within the Treasury Amendment's
exclusion from CEA coverage.''8 These two conclusions are abso-
lutely irreconcilable. If all transactions in foreign currency are ex-
cluded from the CEA by the plain meaning of the Treasury
Amendment, how can the same transactions involving unsophisticated
retail investors not be excluded?
The internal inconsistency in the Salomon Forex opinion may also
be explained through a legal realism analysis. While the court could
dispose of Tauber's inequitable attempts to avoid a legitimate debt
through a plain reading of the Treasury Amendment, because of the
178. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492,
at *7 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of the
Treasury Amendment in Dunn see infra part II.D.
179. Despite articulating an interpretation of the Treasury Amendment which was
diametrically opposed to the Second Circuit's interpretation in American Board of
Trade, the Fourth Circuit went to some lengths to express its apparent belief that the
two opinions did not conflict. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 977-78. According to the
Fourth Circuit, in American Board of Trade the Second Circuit "in dictum, seemed to
indicate that no trading in foreign currency options or futures is excluded from CEA
coverage because such trading is not trading 'in' foreign currencies." Id. (emphasis
added) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803
F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1986)). Characterizing the core holding of American
Board of Trade as mere dictum manifests the Fourth Circuit's considerable reluctance
to criticize what it evidently perceived to be the Second Circuit's equitable holding.
Significantly, in its subsequent determination of Dunn the Second Circuit was pre-
pared to acknowledge that American Board of Trade and Salomon Forex were in con-
ffict. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1995)
("We acknowledge that our interpretation of the phrase 'transactions in foreign cur-
rency' in American Board of Trade conflicts with that of the Fourth Circuit in Salo-
mon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber." (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, No. 95-1181,
1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
180. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 976 (emphasis added).
181. Id at 978.
[Vol. 652340
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
inflexibility of such a plain reading, the court could not do so consist-
ently without creating law that would have left small retail investors
vulnerable to the kind of potential fraud the Second Circuit had previ-
ously proscribed in American Board of Trade. Indeed, the Salomon
Forex court expressly recognized the argument that its decision could
"result in the use of the [Fourth Circuit] as a base for marketing of off-
exchange [currency] contracts to the general public."'t' Conse-
quently, the court contradicted its conclusion that "all" transactions in
foreign currency are excluded from the CEA, by paradoxically limit-
ing that exclusion to only those transactions involving "sophisticated,
large-scale foreign currency traders."1as
C. The Second Circuit's Decision in Dunn
In Dunn,18 the Second Circuit was presented with an opportunity
to revisit the issue originally encountered in American Board of
Trade."ns Dunn arose out of what is alleged to have been a "Ponzi"
scheme' 86 operated by a Bahamas corporation called Delta Options
Ltd.' 7 Delta's principal, William C. Dunn solicited $100 million from
a number of individuals, partnerships, and companies, claiming that
he had devised a profitable investment strategy for currency trad-
ing.'S Beginning in 1992, Dunn used that money to trade in relatively
exotic positions, such as strangles,8 9 in the OTC foreign currency
market. 90 According to his investors, from 1992 to late 1993, Dunn
sent them weekly print-outs showing impressive returns which con-
vinced them to "roll over" their positions.' 9' While it is now apparent
that the print-outs were misleading, so long as the "roll-over" funds
and the money from new investors exceeded losses, any investor who
182. Id.
183. Id at 976-78.
184. 58 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1997).
185. Id. (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of
Trade, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986)).
186. A "Ponzi" scheme is an investment scheme in which returns to investors are
not financed through the success of the underlying business, but are instead taken
from the principal sums of newly attracted investors. Typically, investors in a Ponzi
scheme are promised large returns for their investments and initial investors are actu-
ally paid such returns in order to attract additional investors. Jobin v. McKay, 84 F3d
1330, 1332 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Sender v. Heggland Family Trust, 48 F.3d 470,
471 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995)).
187. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51-52; Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 19.
188. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51.
189. A strangle is the "sale or purchase of a put option and a call option on the
same underlying instrument, with the same expiration, but at strike prices equally out
of the money." Downes & Goodman, supra note 5, at 567. Profits are made on stran-
gles only if the value of the underlying instrument moves dramatically. Id. For a dis-
cussion of options see supra note 5.
190. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51.
191. Id. at 52.
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wished to be "cashed out" could be paid off and the scheme could
continue undiscovered. 192 By November 1993, however, the losses
were too great to be offset by roll-overs and new funds. 19 3 Dunn sud-
denly announced that Delta had incurred trading losses of $95 million
and that investors would not be compensated for their losses. 194
In 1994, the CFTC brought suit in the Southern District of New
York, alleging that Dunn had deceived his investors and requesting
the appointment of a temporary receiver to collect the remaining as-
sets of his operation.195 Dunn opposed the appointment, arguing that
under the Treasury Amendment the CFTC could not attempt to regu-
late options in foreign currency.' 96 When the district court ruled that
Dunn's currency options trades were subject to the CEA, and ap-
pointed a receiver, Dunn brought an interlocutory appeal to the Sec-
ond Circuit.197
Relying on its previous opinion in American Board of Trade, the
Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court. 198 In a sum-
mary analysis, the court reiterated the American Board of Trade ra-
tionale that options are not "transactions in foreign currency" until
they are exercised.' 99
Again, a legal realism analysis of the Dunn case reveals much about
the flaws of the Treasury Amendment. 00 Had the Second Circuit not
read the Treasury Amendment to subject OTC currency options to
CFTC jurisdiction, William Dunn, a party of obviously "unclean
hands," would quite simply have gotten away with fraud.2 1' Because
of the Treasury Amendment's limitations, the Second Circuit was not
able to rule in a manner which would have left the sophisticated in-




195. IM at 52-53. It should be pointed out that the threshold question of whether
the CFTC, rather than the SEC, had jurisdiction over the case against Dunn was
seemingly not considered by the court. As one commentator has argued,
"[a]pparently overlooked was the issue of why the CFrC was involved at all. The
alleged fraudulent activity involved investors who had not traded currencies but had
rather purchased investment contracts, securities governed by the securities laws."
Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 19. For a discussion of the investment contract
issue associated with the Dunn case see supra note 213.
196. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 53.
197. 141
198. IM (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803
F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1986)). Again, the Second Circuit did not address the
investment contract issue.
199. Dunn, 58 F.3d at 53 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American
Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d at 1248-49).
200. 58 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1995) rev'd, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25,
1997).
201. The equitable maxim, "no person shall profit from his own wrongdoing"
would seem particularly appropriate with regard to the Second Circuit's determina-
tion of the Dunn case. See id at 51-53; supra note 135.
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simultaneously allowing the CFTC to protect the general public from
fraudulent operators like Dunn. Therefore, relying on the American
Board of Trade rationale, the court chose to apply an interpretation of
the Treasury Amendment which although "wholly unpersuasive,"2' at
least allowed it to enjoin the fraud involved. 0 3
Significantly, the court did so with considerable reluctance. Noting
that the Fourth Circuit had rejected its American Board of Trade ra-
tionale, the Second Circuit deferred to the general principle that "a
later panel may not disregard the reasoning of a decision because an
entirely different line of reasoning was available."'20 Thus, noting
only that "[w]hatever doubts this panel may have about the interpre-
tation given the Treasury Amendment in American Board of Trade...
are not grounds for our declining to follow it," the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the conflict between American Board of Trade and Salo-
mon Forex "is for the Supreme Court, not us, to resolve."205
D. The Supreme Court's Determination of Dunn: Toward a More
Predictable Treasury Amendment Jurisprudence
Significantly, although in Dunn the Supreme Court unambiguously
held that the Treasury Amendment's phrase "transactions in foreign
currency" plainly encompasses currency options, it nevertheless seems
to have appreciated the equitable considerations which had prompted
lower courts to indulge in results-oriented jurisprudence.20 6 As the
Court acknowledged, "an important public policy dispute" underlying
the Treasury Amendment's application, would survive its opinion in
Dunn, "with substantial arguments favoring each side. '"2°
In the face of such apparent sensitivity to its concerns, the CFTC
was understandably "disappointed" by the Dunn Court's decision,
Through the Dunn holding, the Supreme Court not only refused to
sanction CFTC action against Dunn specifically, it has completely
eviscerated what had been the CFTC's primary basis for asserting ju-
risdiction over the currency option markets generally.209
202. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492,
at *4 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
203. See Dunn, 58 F.3d at 53.
204. Id
205. Id at 54.
206. No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492, at *3, *8 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
207. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *8.
208. Edward Felsenthal & Aaron Lucchetti, High Court Rules Against CFTC in
Options Case, Wall St. J., Feb. 26 1997, at C17.
209. Because the Dunn Court held that the Treasury Amendment's term "transac-
tion in foreign currency" clearly encompasses currency options, the CFrC can no
longer claim that it retains jurisdiction over currency options until they are exercised.
Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *3-4. Nevertheless, the CFTC may still contend that a
broad reading of the term "board of trade" allows it to police all currency option
transactions. This contention has proved successful in the past. See Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993 VL 809966, at
2343
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Yet the Dunn decision is best understood not as an evisceration of
the CFTC's ability to protect small investors, but as a simple repudia-
tion of results-oriented jurisprudence. Although the Dunn Court rec-
ognized the CFTC's concern "that options are particularly susceptible
to fraud and abuse if not policed," ' it confined its inquiry to the most
"narrow issue" presented by Dunn.21' Indeed, the Court focused on
the question of whether the phrase "'transactions in foreign currency'
... includes transactions in options to buy or sell foreign currency,"
seemingly to the exclusion of all other considerations212
*7, *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993) (holding that the term "board of trade" includes any
association of persons engaged in the business of selling currency contracts). For a
discussion of the Standard Forex holding see infra part III.A.2.
210. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *8.
211. Id. at *3.
212. In particular, the Court apparently felt it unnecessary to even address the
question of whether the investment contracts at issue in Dunn could constitute securi-
ties. See id. at *1-8. Dunn's operation, Delta Options Ltd., sold investment contracts
to the public. Id. at *2; see also Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51 (same). Although these invest-
ment contracts were marketed as opportunities to participate in a currency option
trading strategy, they nevertheless could constitute securities governed by the SEC
under the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78 (c)(10) (defining the term "se-
curity" to include, inter alia, "investment contracts"). The Court's reluctance to ad-
dress the investment contract issue raised by Dunn is somewhat surprising, because at
least one justice had demonstrated a sensitivity to that issue at oral argument. See Th
of Supreme Court Oral Argument at 22, Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 58 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1181) [hereinafter Oral Argument]
("[W]hat Dunn/Delta are doing ...doesn't fall between the regulators because
clearly what Dunn is doing falls within the SEC bailiwick because .... what you're
doing is having contracts with your investors and those would count as securities."
(Ginsburg, J.)).
Although this Note does not attempt a comprehensive treatment of the investment
contract issue raised by Dunn, the uncertainty associated with that issue would appear
to be at least sufficient to merit a brief discussion. As noted supra at note 26, in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) the Supreme Court held that any profit-mak-
ing scheme, whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and expects to
make a profit solely from the efforts of the promoter who is responsible for manage-
ment, is an "investment contract" governed by the securities laws. Id. at 298-99.
The facts of Dunn are highly suggestive of the "common enterprise" element de-
fined in Howey: Dunn solicited money from various investors who arguably relied on
his self-professed expertise in currency trading and expected to make a profit solely
through his efforts. See Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51. The currency options transactions at
issue were made with the pool of money collected from investors; and were executed
in Delta Options' name with no options being sold directly to investors. Id. In factual
circumstances analogous to those in Dunn, several cases have found that "investment
contracts" in commodity options or forwards represent securities as defined by
Howey. See SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Jenson
v. Continental Financial Corp., 404 F. Supp. 792, 805 (D. Minn. 1975).
On the other hand, as one commentator has noted, most investment contracts to
participate in options and futures transactions would seem to lack the commonality
and reliance requirements necessary to make them securities under Howey. See Com-
mittee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 67. Such contracts are bilateral, gen-
erally supported by some sort of "receivable" in the underlying commodity, with
profits being made solely through favorable market movements. Id. A majority of
courts have subscribed to this analysis, rejecting the argument that counterparty risk
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raised by the case. 13
alone creates a "common enterprise" as defined by Howey. See, eg., Burton v. Hei-
nold Commodities, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 360, 361-62 (E.D. Va. 1986) (holding that even
where plaintiff relied upon expertise of promoter in buying and selling commodities,
plaintiff's investment contract in commodities account was not a security within the
meaning of the securities laws); SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that transactions involving the sale of gold for future delivery were
not securities, because (1) profits would not have come "solely" from the efforts of
others but from fluctuations in the price of gold; and (2) to the extent purchasers
relied on the managerial skill of seller, they did so as an ordinary buyer, who having
advanced the purchase price, relies on an ordinary seller to fulfill his obligations);
NOA v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that agreements
to deliver silver bars within 30 days of receipt of payment with outstanding buyback
option at market price were not securities, because profits depended solely on fluctua-
tions in the price of silver); LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., 523 F. Supp.
819, 830 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that standby commitment to take delivery of gov-
ernment securities at holder's option at set price, was not a security because profits
depended on fluctuation in the price of underlying securities), affd, 704 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983). Under the analysis applied by these courts, the
investment contracts in Dunn may not represent securities. Despite investors' pur-
ported reliance on Dunn's self-professed expertise, profits ultimately depended on
favorable movements in the currencies involved. See Dunn, 58 F.3d at 51.
In addition, other courts have held that the 1974 Amendments to the CEA stripped
the SEC of any jurisdiction it may have had over commodity options as investment
contracts. See, e.g., SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1029, 1030-31 (N.D. IlM 1976)
(holding that after the 1974 Amendments to the CEA, options on silver futures con-
tracts were not subject to SEC jurisdiction); cf SEC v. American Commodity Exch.,
546 F.2d 1361, 1366-68 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that investment schemes offering
fictitious options on commodity futures were "investment contracts" within SEC ju-
risdiction because the offers were made prior to the effective date of the 1974 CEA
Amendments). The Supreme Court's holding in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1989) could lend support to this approach. See id. at 67 (holding that for purposes of
determining whether a note constitutes a security, lower courts should "examine,"
inter alia, "whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the
Securities Acts unnecessary.").
In any case, regardless of the justification, the Second Circuit's American Board of
Trade and Dunn decisions, and indeed the Supreme Court's determination of Dunn,
were clearly predicated on an unquestioning acceptance of the CFIC's assertion of
jurisdiction. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50,53 (2d Cir.
1995), rev'd on other grounds, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
In sum, although the Supreme Court's narrow ruling on the statutory construction
question presented by Dunn appears beyond reproach, the Court's failure to address
the investment contract issue associated with the facts of the case is disappointing. As
discussed infra at notes 397 and 404, this omission may prove significant in light of
two of the proposed revisions to the Treasury Amendment currently being considered
by Congress.
213. In addition to eschewing the investment contract issue associated with Dunn,
discussed supra at note 212, the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide which admin-
istrative agency-the Treasury Department or the CFTC-should be entitled, under
the Chevron doctrine, to deference to its interpretation of the Treasury Amendment.
Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *7 n.14 (quoting Dole v. United Steelworkers of America,
494 U.S. 26,42 (1990)). In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court held that if a statute is ambiguous,
the interpretations of the agency charged with administering it "are given controlling
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With regard to its specific holding on the "narrow" statutory con-
struction question presented, the Dunn Court's opinion was unequivo-
cal: "There can be no question that the purchase or sale of a foreign
currency option is a transaction 'respecting' foreign currency. We
think it equally plain as a matter of ordinary meaning that such an
option is a transaction 'in' foreign currency for purposes of the 'fTeas-
ury Amendment." '214
For the Court, a literal reading of the Treasury Amendment's board
of trade proviso confirmed that currency options transactions are ex-
empted from the CEA. As the Court noted, "[t]o fall within the pro-
viso, a transaction "must involve the sale [of foreign currency] for
future delivery" conducted on a board of trade.215 The CFTC, aware
that this language indicates that OTC transactions, or transactions
conducted off a board of trade "for future delivery" are exempt from
the CEA, contended that it provided a basis for distinguishing options
and futures.216 In the CFTC's view, the term "for future delivery"
encompasses only futures, because unlike options, a futures contract
anticipates actual "delivery" of the underlying currency at the time the
transaction is consummated.217
The Court rejected this distinction summarily. As the Court recog-
nized, both OTC currency futures and OTC options are transactions
weight," unless manifestly unreasonable. Id. at 843-44. Because the Dunn Court de-
termined that the Treasury Amendment "'clearly expresses Congress' intention"' to
exclude foreign currency options from the CEA, it declined to definitively resolve the
Chevron issue associated with the case. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *7 n.14. Neverthe-
less, the Court did strongly suggest that the Treasury Department rather than the
CFTC would be the agency owed deference:
If Chevron principles were applicable, we are unsure that the CFTC's posi-
tion would be the one owed deference. As the Commission concedes.., the
Treasury Department has taken quite a different view of the [Treasury
Amendment] .... A reasonable argument could be made that Congress
intended to charge Treasury, rather than the Commission, with administer-
ing the dimensions of the aptly named Treasury Amendment, which was spe-
cifically enacted at the behest of the Treasury Department to confine the
CFTC's activities.
Id.
214. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *3. Although this Note recognizes that any doctrinal
analysis of Supreme Court decisions is best left to constitutional scholars, it is not
unreasonable to assert that the literal reading of the Treasury Amendment articulated
by the Dunn holding is consistent with the current Court's general "inclination to give
statutes their 'plain meaning."' Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20. For general
commentary on the current Supreme Court's textualist approach to statutory inter-
pretation see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Stat-
utes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 621, 656-66 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualisnv An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995).
215. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *7.
216. 1d
217. See id. at *4, *7.
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in the same subject matter, namely foreign currency.218 Distinguishing
futures and options on the basis of the potential for each to result in
actual delivery is divorced from the practical and economic realities of
the OTC currency market.219 Like holders of OTC futures, parties to
OTC options contracts are not required to fulfill their obligations by
actually delivering the underlying commodity at the time of execu-
tion-as the Court put it-"[njo currency changes hands at the time
the futures contract is made."'  In fact, as the Court pointed out, the
typical futures contract is extinguished before delivery by entry into
an offsetting transaction. 2 Moreover, both OTC futures and OTC
options are contracts for future or deferred delivery in that they both
grant the holder the right to require the purchase or sale of a currency
on a future date.2' Therefore, the Court concluded that "[b]ecause
options convey the right to buy or sell foreign currency at some future
time... they are transactions 'involv[ing]' ... the sale of foreign cur-
rency for future delivery."'  Thus, for the Court "the proviso's lan-
guage fairly accommodates both options and futures."'
The Court went on to note that the legislative history of the Treas-
ury Amendment supported its determination that all transactions in
foreign currency, including options, are excluded from the CEA3z '
The Court acknowledged that because the currency option market
simply did not exist in 1974, and indeed did not really develop until
sometime after 198211 Congress could not have specifically intended
to exempt currency option transactions from the CEA. 7 The general
intent of Congress, however, was clear. As the Court stated, "Con-
gress' broad purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to pro-
vide a general exemption from CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-
218. Id.
219. See id. at *4. Among other things, in some circumstances options are granted
on futures contracts, which would seem to add additional complexity to any attempt
at distinguishing the two instruments on the basis of actual delivery. See Group of
Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 34.
220. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *4.
221. Id; see Mayer, supra note 1, at 291-92 (noting that "(o]nly 0.64 percent of
outstanding futures contracts were settled by the physical delivery of the products
involved in 1993").
222. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *7. For a discussion of options see supra note 5.
223. Id
224. Id.
225. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *5-7. Although Justice Scalia concurred with both
the Court's judgment and its textual analysis of the Treasury Amendment, he did not
join the Court's discussion of the Treasury Amendment's legislative history. Accord-
ing to Scalia, "the Court's extensive discussion of legislative history ... as though that
were necessary to confirm the 'plain meaning of the language,' or (worse) might have
power to overcome it... achievets] nothing useful and sow[s] confusion in the law."
Id. at *8.
226. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
227. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *5.
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exchange foreign currency trading."228 According to the Court, the
fact that the participants in the interbank market-the very same par-
ticipants that existed in 1974, namely large banks-are now currently
trading currency options in addition to forwards, did nothing to
change the original exclusionary intent of the statute. "[T]he reasons
underlying the Treasury Department's desire [in 1974] to exempt off-
exchange commodity futures trading from CFTC regulation apply
with equal force today... [w]e therefore think the purposes underly-
ing the Treasury Amendment are most properly fulfilled by giving ef-
fect to the plain meaning of the language as Congress enacted it."22 9
Despite the conclusive nature of the Dunn Court's decision, a legis-
lative review of the Treasury Amendment remains necessary. The
Treasury Amendment was enacted in 1974 to address the Treasury
Department's concerns that the sophisticated interbank market might
be subject to CEA jurisdiction. As the American Board of Trade deci-
sion demonstrates, by 1986 the Treasury Amendment no longer ful-
filled that purpose. Because it was not drafted to anticipate the
subsequent development of currency derivative instruments that could
be used both by the Interbank Industry for legitimate business pur-
poses and unscrupulous currency traders for fraud, by its literal terms
the Treasury Amendment does not adequately address the policy re-
quirements of contemporary currency markets. As a result, where
they have felt it necessary, lower courts have consistently read into the
Treasury Amendment various provisions that allow them to proscribe
fraud.23 o
As the Supreme Court's holding in Dunn indicates, such results-
oriented jurisprudence is unacceptable. Quite apart from undermin-
ing public confidence in the doctrinal integrity of the judiciary, results-
oriented jurisprudence is inherently unpredictable and maintaining a
dependable, predictable legal system is vital to the continued strength
of the domestic economy. 3 Thus, the Treasury Amendment needs to
228. Id For a discussion of the legislative history of the Treasury Amendment see
supra part I.C.
229. Id. But for a discussion of the Standard Forex court's flexible interpretation of
the Treasury Amendment see infra part III.A.2.
230. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50,53 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that where currency options were marketed to the general public, the
term "transactions in foreign currency" does not encompass currency options until
those options were exercised); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd.
of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL 809966, at *7, *11
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993) (holding that the term "board of trade" includes any associa-
tion of persons engaged in the business of selling currency contracts to unsophistica-
ted investors); Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 978 (4th Cir. 1993), reh'g
denied, 511 U.S. 1138 (noting in apparent dicta that only those currency option trans-
actions involving sophisticated institutions are exempted transactions in foreign cur-
rency" for purposes of the Treasury Amendment).
231. It is a fundamental premise of western society that "capitalistic enterprise...
cannot do without legal certainty." Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother, Can You
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be revised in a way that would allow courts to achieve equitable re-
sults without having to resort to results-oriented jurisprudence.
There is another reason for revising the Treasury Amendment.
Although the Dunn Court rendered a definitive interpretation of the
term "transactions in foreign currency," the recently emerged conflict
between the Standard Forex' z and Frankivell Bullion233 courts' inter-
pretations of the term "board of trade" threatens to prolong the
Treasury Amendment controversy indefinitely.23 As part HI of this
Note argues, this new conflict demonstrates that the current formula-
tion of the Treasury Amendment remains flawed despite the Dunn
decision. As such, the conflict between Standard Forex and Frankwell
Bullion reflects what the Dunn Court recognized as the compelling
public policy considerations which remain on both the Interbank In-
dustry and CFTC side of the Treasury Amendment debate.235 As the
Dunn holding indicates, however, and indeed as the Supreme Court
expressly stated, those kinds of considerations "are best addressed to
the Congress, not the courts." 236
Ill. A REVISION OF THE TREASURY AMENDMENT
The controversy surrounding the Treasury Amendment is essen-
tially a function of the fundamental challenge presented by derivatives
generally.3 7 As the derivatives markets have expanded they have
created tremendous definitional problems for preexisting regulatory
regimes.3 8 In the instant context, the preexisting regulatory structure
created by the Treasury Amendment has been rendered obsolete by
the subsequent development of the interbank market in currency op-
tions. This part argues that as a result, the current formulation of the
Treasury Amendment is entirely inadequate as a regulatory tool for
Spare a Ruble? The Development of Bankruptcy Legislation in the New Russia, 10
Bankr. Dev. J. 343, 348 (1994) (quoting Max Weber, Economy and Society 729
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968)); see also Alexander Reus, Eastern Ger-
many Report Investment Incentives in the New Lander, 4 U. Miami Bus. LJ. 1, 1
(1994) (noting that a predictable legal system is a prerequisite for a favorable invest-
ment climate). For a discussion of the negative consequences of results-oriented juris-
prudence within the specific context of the Treasury Amendment controversy, see
supra part III.
232. No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL 809966 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993).
233. 99 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1996). The conflict between Standard Forer and
Frankwell Bullion is discussed at infra part III.A.2.
234. As noted above, under the Treasury Amendment, "transactions in foreign cur-
rency" remain subject to CFTC jurisdiction if they involve a -sale ... for future deliv-
ery conducted on a board of trade." See 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
235. Dunn, 1997 WL 75492, at *8.
236. Id (citing United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 555 (1979)).
237. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.




the contemporary currency markets.239 Because of that inadequacy,
courts have manipulated the text of the Amendment in order to
achieve equitable results. 0 Such a situation is unacceptable to both
the CFTC and the Interbank Industry. As the Treasury Department
has stated:
[S]ince the Treasury Amendment's enactment, the scope of CEA
coverage has continued to be a troublesome source of legal uncer-
tainty .... Determining how to draw the line between instruments
that are subject to the CEA and those that are not, in a manner that
provides logical consistency and predictability.., has been difficult
under current law.24 '
As an alternative to "current law," this part proposes a new regulatory
regime which would address both the CFTC's and the Interbank In-
dustry's concerns.
A. The CFTC's Requirement: Protecting the General Public from
the Fraudulent Marketing of Foreign Currency Options
This section argues that in circumstances where currency options
are systematically marketed to unsophisticated retail investors CFTC
jurisdiction is necessary.
1. Protecting Unsophisticated Retail Investors
As a threshold matter, the Interbank Industry might argue that
there is no need for CFTC intervention in any transaction involving
currency options, even where there is actual fraud, because injured
parties will always have recourse to fraud and contract remedies. 42
239. As many as ten years ago the Federal Reserve Board recognized a public pol-
icy need for a more flexible reading of the Treasury Amendment:
We understand that the CFrC has concerns about protecting members of
the general public to the extent that currency futures and options may be
marketed by banks and other dealers operating in the interbank market to
customers outside the traditional bank foreign exchange market. Where
market participants differ from the knowledgeable bank clientele usual in
the interbank market, we would agree that supplemental protection would
be useful .... Therefore we believe a somewhat flexible standard is appro-
priate for measuring proper customer participation in the bank OTC futures
and options markets covered by the Treasury Amendment.
Letter from Michael Bradfield, Federal Reserve Board, to Kenneth M. Raisler, Gen-
eral Counsel, CFTC (Mar. 5, 1986), quoted in Committee on Futures Regulation,
supra note 10, at 37-38.
240. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir.
1995) rev'd, No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1986); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL
809966, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993).
241. Treasury Department Proposal to Amend the Treasury Amendment, commen-
tary at 1-2 (Feb. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Treasury Proposal] (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
242. See Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20.
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This argument would clearly hold true for the corporate constituents
of the Interbank Industry, who presumably have both the financial
acumen to appreciate that they are being defrauded and the resources
to seek redress for their injuries through fraud or contract law. 2 " A
small retail investor, however, does not have those advantages.
Indeed, such an investor, unlike the large institutional participants
in the interbank market, is uniquely vulnerable to the kind of systemic
and fraudulent marketing of currency options that once characterized
bucket shop operations. 2 " As the CFTC has noted, "[f]raudulent
sales of foreign currency futures and option contracts to the public
have been a significant problem since at least the late 1980s."5 Re-
cently the CFTC has been disturbed by an "increase in advertising on
the Internet of foreign currency... options being offered to the pub-
lic." ' 6 As the Commission has argued, "[t]he availability of such new
technology to solicit customers" enhances the threat that currency op-
tions will be used to defraud unsophisticated retail investors.247
Given these legitimate concerns, this Note argues that where cur-
rency options are fraudulently and systematically marketed to unso-
phisticated retail customers, the CFTC is needed to both assist the
injured customers seek redress and enjoin continued fraud and
exploitation.2'
2. Legal Realism Revisited: Standard Forex and Frankwell Bullion
That CFTC action is necessary to protect unsophisticated retail in-
vestors from the fraudulent use of currency options is amply demon-
strated through an analysis of the factual circumstances of American
Board of Trade 9 and Dunn. 0 More recently, the policy arguments
for such protection were reflected by the facts underlying Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Standard Forex, Inc. 15
243. See infra notes 350-80 and accompanying text.
244. For a discussion of "bucket shops" and other fraudulent uses of options which
have historically provided the justification for options regulation, see supra notes 46-
84 and accompanying text.
245. CFTC Explanatory Statement Concerning the CFTC's Proposed Revision of
the CEA's Treasury Amendment 2 [hereinafter CFTC Proposal] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review)
246. lt at 2-3. See infra notes 251-71 and accompanying text (discussing Commod-
ity Futures Trading Conm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL
809966 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993), a case involving the fraudulent marketing of cur-
rency futures to unsophisticated retail investors).
247. CFTC Proposal, supra note 245, at 3.
248. Congress has repeatedly recognized the need for such protection. See supra
notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
249. See supra part II.A.
250. See supra part HI.C.
251. No. CV-93-0088, 1993 WL 809966 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993) [hereinafter "Stan-
dard Forex "J (granting CFTC request for injunction); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Standard Forex, Inc., No. CV-92-0088, 1996 WL 435440
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a. How the Standard Forex Court Recognized the Need for CFTC
Protection of Unsophisticated Retail Investors
In Standard Forex, the CFTC sought an injunction against an entity
calling itself Standard Forex, Inc., which had been fraudulently mar-
keting forward contracts" 2 in British pounds to members of the gen-
eral public.2 5 3 Standard Forex promised customers that they were
certain to earn profits through their accounts.' -' Although the com-
pany required each of its customers to sign a risk disclosure statement,
that statement was written in English while many of Standard Forex's
customers were new immigrants who spoke little or no English.5 5 In-
deed, Standard Forex apparently targeted unsophisticated investors
exclusively; as the court observed "no contracts were marketed to
large institutional investors... Standard Forex sold itself purely as an
investment vehicle for the general public. '256 After obtaining custom-
ers, Standard Forex proceeded to trade currency with them under an
agreement which to the court sounded "dangerously close to illegal
bucketing, which occurs when the trading company itself holds the op-
posite half of a customer's position rather then putting the trade
through to a neutral market." 7 Not surprisingly, by the time the
CFTC stepped in to try to enjoin Standard Forex's activities, there had
already been substantial losses, with 194 customers losing in excess of
$3,000,000, or over seventy-five percent of their original investment.258
As discussed above, despite the limited flexibility of the Treasury
Amendment's language, the CFTC has in the past expressed its appar-
ent belief that the Treasury Amendment is applicable only to in-
terbank transactions involving sophisticated institutions and not to
transactions involving members of the general public.259 In Standard
Forex, the court deferred to this interpretation of the Treasury
Amendment, through a rather novel reading of the Amendment's
board of trade proviso. As noted above, the board of trade proviso
excludes from the CEA "transactions in foreign currency ... unless
such transactions involve the sale ... for future delivery conducted on
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996) [hereinafter "Standard Forex IF'] (denying defendant Stan-
dard Forex's motion for summary judgment).
252. See supra note 11 for a discussion of forward contracts.
253. Standard Forex I, 1993 WL 809966, at *4, *21.
254. Id. at *6.
255. Standard Forex I, 1996 WL 435440, at *4 n.4.
256. Id. at *11.
257. Id. at *9 n.9 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(iv) (1994)).
258. Standard Forex 1, 1993 WL 809966, at *6.
259. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text. That interpretation relies pri-
marily on the Treasury Amendment's legislative history for support. See id. The
CFTC has characterized Congress' remarks about the passage of the Treasury
Amendment as an "expression" that the Amendment was meant to exclude only the
interbank market from its jurisdiction, and was not therefore "intended" to cut off
CFTC jurisdiction over public currency option fraud. CFTC Interpretive Letter, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,983 (1985).
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a board of trade."' 260 The meaning of this language would appear to
be clear-all deferred delivery transactions are excluded from the
CEA unless conducted on a board of trade. As a result, because Stan-
dard Forex was not a formally organized board of trade such as
CBOT, this language would seem to have precluded CFTC jurisdic-
tion. But in light of the gross fraud committed by Standard Forex, and
with no relief other then CFTC intervention apparently available, it is
perhaps not surprising that the court concluded otherwise.
The court began by noting that the CEA itself defines a "board of
trade" as "any exchange or association, whether incorporated or unin-
corporated, of persons who are engaged in the business of buying or
selling any commodity or receiving the same on consignment. 2 61 Af-
ter reviewing the Treasury Amendment's legislative history, the court
then determined that Congress "intended to exempt only interbank
transactions that were already regulated by the banking regulatory
agencies. '262 From there, the court concluded that for purposes of the
Treasury Amendment, "[t]he definition of the term 'board of trade'
includes both formally organized exchanges and informal associations
of persons engaged in the business of buying and selling," foreign cur-
rencies, including Standard Forex.3
The problem with applying such a broad definition of the term
"board of trade" is that it renders the Treasury Amendment meaning-
less. As the court itself recognized, "given the breadth of the meaning
of board of trade, the 'unless' clause of the amendment threatens to
swallow the whole. Almost all transactions in futures contracts could
be characterized as occurring on a 'board of trade' involving 'informal
associations of people engaged in the business of buying and selling
commodities.'",64
As this acknowledgment would suggest, Congress may well have
understood the term "board of trade" as used by the Treasury
Amendment to mean a formally organized exchange, rather than a
"board of trade" as defined by the CEA. -15 Such an inconsistency is
not inconceivable-as the Supreme Court remarked in Dunn, Con-
gress's choice of language for the CEA "has been far from consis-
260. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
261. Standard Forex 1, 1993 WL 809966, at *7 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § la(1) (1994)).
262. Id. at *10.
263. Id. at *7; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co. Petro Marketing
Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a gasoline broker oper-
ating a chain of retail gasoline outlets and marketing futures contracts in petroleum
products was a "board of trade"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American
Metal Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 176-79, 193 (D.NJ. 1988), aff'd in part and va-
cated in part on other grounds, 1993 WL 102177 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 1993) (holding that a
company selling precious metal futures contracts was a "board of trade"); In re
Stovall, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 20,941, 23,779-82 n.28 (Dec. 6, 1979) (holding that a
broker's agency operation was a "board of trade").
264. Standard Forex I, 1993 WL 809966, at *8.
265. See 7 U.S.C. § la(1) (1994).
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tent."" 6 Indeed, legislative remarks on the enactment of the Treasury
Amendment appear to confirm that the term "board of trade" as used
in the Treasury Amendment was meant to refer exclusively to organ-
ized exchanges: "[T]he Committee included an amendment to clarify
that the provisions of the bill are not applicable to trading in foreign
currencies and certain enumerated financial instruments unless such
trading is conducted on a formally organized futures exchange."' 67
Nevertheless, for the Standard Forex court, only by defining the
term "board of trade" in such a broad manner could it provide a rem-
edy for Standard Forex's defrauded customers. Thus, ignoring the ap-
parent paradox created by its holding, the court defined the term
"board of trade" to include Standard Forex.268 Finding that Standard
Forex's "unlawful conduct was systematic as opposed to an isolated
occurrence" the court granted the CFTC's request for a preliminary
injunction.269 Additionally the court issued an order freezing all of
Standard Forex's assets to assure that relief could be made available
to its customers.270
The facts and outcome of the Standard Forex case illustrate why
CFTC intervention on behalf of unsophisticated investors is necessary.
Without such intervention, unsophisticated investors are vulnerable to
foreign currency fraud. Standard Forex is also significant as another
case which-under the lights of a legal realism analysis-reveals the
flaws of the Treasury Amendment. 7' Although the court's rationale
and holding appear considerably stronger then the rationale applied
by the Second Circuit in American Board of Trade and Dunn,2 7 2 Stan-
dard Forex nevertheless represents one more example of the judici-
ary's response to the inflexibility of the Treasury Amendment. In
essence, the Standard Forex court, like the Second Circuit in American
Board of Trade and Dunn, reached a strained reading of the Treasury
Amendment in order to justify an equitable result.2 73
b. An Unfortunate Collateral Effect Exposing the Interbank
Industry to Continued Jurisdictional Uncertainty and the
Threat of CFTC Regulation
The problem with the Standard Forex court's results-oriented juris-
prudence was that it exposes the Interbank Industry to the continued
threat of CFTC regulation despite the Supreme Court's determination
266. No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492, at *6 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
267. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 23, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5863 (emphasis added).
268. Standard Forex 1, 1993 WL 809966, at *7.
269. Id. at *23.
270. Id. at *24.
271. See supra part II.D.
272. See supra parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
273. See supra part II.
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of Dunn.2 7 4 As the Treasury Department has stated, the ambiguity
stemming from the Standard Forex rationale, "has significantly dimin-
ished the efficacy of the Treasury Amendment in providing a bright-
line exclusion from the CEA for the markets in the enumerated finan-
cial products."275 This assertion is valid. While the Standard Forex
holding apparently limited itself to circumstances involving informally
organized associations which engaged in the business of selling cur-
rency transactions to private unsophisticated investors, the court's ba-
sic rationale could provide for CFTC regulation of the Interbank
Industry.2 7 6 For example, a currency trading desk at any Industry in-
stitution could certainly be characterized as an "informal association
of persons engaged in the business of buying and selling" foreign cur-
rency.277 Indeed, although his argument was rejected on procedural
grounds, Dr. Tauber had urged such a characterization of Salomon's
trading facilities in the Salomon Forex litigation.278 Disturbingly,
since the Standard Forex decision, the CFTC has utilized its rationale
to argue that the term "'board of trade' includes any association sell-
ing foreign currency, [thus] making the Treasury Amendment very
narrow."
279
In sum, while the outcome of Standard Forex may have been fair,
the rationale used by the court to reach that outcome is not only vul-
274. The Dunn Court focused exclusively on the question of whether the term
"transactions in foreign currency" encompasses currency options. See No. 95-1181,
1997 WL 75492 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997); supra part II.D. It could be argued that the
Dunn Court's suggestion that under Chevron principles any deference to an agency's
interpretation of the Treasury Amendment is owed to the Treasury Department,
rather than the CFTC, undermines the Standard Forex holding. Dunn, 1997 WL
75492, at *7 n.14 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). As discussed at supra note 213, the Chevron Court
held that where a statute is ambiguous, the interpretations of the agency charged with
administering it "are given controlling weight." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Because
the Treasury Amendment's use of the term "board of trade" is arguably ambiguous,
and because the Dunn Court suggested that the Treasury Department rather than the
CFTC is the agency charged with administering it, the Standard Forex court arguably
erred by deferring to the CFTC interpretation. See Dunn 1997 WL 75492, at *7 n.14.
It is not clear that such an argument would prevail, however, because the Supreme
Court did not expressly rule on the Chevron issue associated with Dunn. See id
275. Treasury Proposal, supra note 241, commentary at 2. "The use of [the term
"board of trade"] has given rise to many of the interpretive difficulties that exist
under current law." Id at 6.
276. See Standard Forex 1, 1993 WL 809966, at *7-11.
277. See id. at *7.
278. 8 F.3d 966, 973 n.5 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting Tauber's appellate argument that
Salomon constituted a "board of trade," but ruling that "[w]hile we would be inclined
to reject that position, we choose not to decide its validity since it was not argued
before the district court.").
279. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Frankwell Bullion, 99 F.3d 299, 301
(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Although, the CFTC also argued "that 'board of
trade' includes all associations except banks and other sophisticated investors," it did
so only as "a falback position." Id.
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nerable to analytical criticism, it was, at least from the Interbank In-
dustry's perspective, unacceptably broad.
The Ninth Circuit concluded as much in its recent determination of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd.8 °
In Frankwell Bullion, the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected the Standard
Forex holding.28 As the court put it: "To hold, as Standard Forex did,
that the Treasury Amendment excludes only transactions between
banks and other sophisticated investors would require this court to
craft, without any support from the statutory language, some distinc-
tion between sophisticated investors and the general public. ''282
Significantly, Frankwell Bullion appears to have been a case that
lacked the equitable considerations which were at the heart of the
Standard Forex litigation. Although Frankwell Bullion involved offers
by Frankwell Bullion Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation, of foreign cur-
rency transactions to the general public, it seemingly did not involve
fraud. 83 Instead, the CFTC brought suit alleging that Frankwell Bul-
lion's activities violated sections 5 and 6 of the CEA.2 4 Thus,
Frankwell Bullion may represent another example of a case where the
CFTC aggressively asserted its authority, "regardless of the jurisdic-
tional fit."'2 85 It should not be surprising, therefore, that the Ninth
Circuit rejected the CFTC's strained reading of the term "board of
trade." 6
The conflict between Standard Forex and Frankwell Bullion is remi-
niscent of the conflict which led to the Supreme Court's determination
of Dunn.87 A legal realism analysis of both reveals the shortcomings
of the Treasury Amendment. Although they originate from compet-
ing interpretations of two discrete terms-"board of trade" and
"transactions in foreign currency"-both the Standard Forex and
Dunn conflicts arose from the same underlying issue: The Treasury
Amendment's failure to reconcile the CFTC's legitimate desire to pro-
tect small retail investors with the Interbank Industry's equally legiti-
mate desire to be free from the threat of CFTC regulation.
280. 99 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1996).
281. 1& at 304.
282. Id.
283. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd., No. C-94-
2166#DLJ, 1994 WL 449071 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1994); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd., 904 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(describing facts of case generally), affd, 99 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1996).
284. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994); Frankwell Bullion, 99 F.3d at 301.
285. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
286. Frankwell Bullion, 99 F.3d at 304.
287. See supra part II.
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B. The Interbank Industry's Requirement A Market Free from
Unnecessary CFTC Regulation
As discussed above, CFTC jurisdiction appears necessary in circum-
stances where unsophisticated retail investors are vulnerable to the
systematic and fraudulent marketing of currency options. In contrast,
this section argues that CFTC regulation of the Interbank Industry
would be both a superfluous and an unnecessary encumbrance to the
Industry's efficiency.
1. The Interbank Currency Market
The global interbank currency market has been described as "a
highly liquid, twenty-four hour, global, high-technology bazaar," with
"no centralized exchange analogous to a stock market"; instead it is a
market consisting primarily of "thousands of commercial and invest-
ment banks from around the world."m The United States's interest
in sustaining its prominence in this market is enormous.' U.S. com-
mercial and investment banks are active traders in the interbank mar-
ket, U.S. brokerage companies regularly arrange deals among traders,
and the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve frequently in-
tervene in the market to effect the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar
relative to other currencies. 290
Even discounting the prominence of U.S. financial institutions, the
United States is ineluctably involved in the interbank market because
the U.S. dollar is bought or sold against other currencies in over
eighty-three percent of all market trades.291 Such trades contribute to
what by many accounts, is the largest market in the world, with the
equivalent of $1.1 trillion in different currencies changing hands every
day.2 92
In the United States, the average daily turnover in the OTC foreign
currency options portion of the interbank market was $20 billion in
1995.293 The OTC option portion of the market plays a unique role in
allowing domestic corporations engaged in international trade to man-
288. See Bhala, supra note 14, at 869-70.
289. Id. at 869.
290. Id.
291. See BIS Survey, supra note 2, at 7 ("[T]he US dollar was involved on one side
in 83% of all transactions worldwide... it thus remained by far the most important
currency in the foreign exchange market, partly because of its use as a vehicle cur-
rency for cross-trading between other currencies.").
292. See id., at 5; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, U.S. Foreign Exchange Inter-
vention, Fedpoints #44 (1994); see also Bahia, supra note 14, at 868 ("Every day, an
average of one trillion dollars worth of foreign currencies are traded" in the interbank
market); Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor: Jungle Predator or
Shorn Lamb, 12 Yale J. Reg. 345, 357 (Summer 1995) (characterizing the foreign ex-
change market as "one of the world's largest financial markets").
293. See Central Bank Survey, supra note 157, at Annex II, tbl. 5.
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age currency risk.294 There are two fundamental reasons for this.
First, OTC options, unlike futures and forwards, have a downside that
is limited to the loss of the premium: if an option is not profitable, or
is out-of-the-money, there is no obligation to exercise it.295 On the
other hand, futures and forwards expose the holder to the potentially
large downside associated with unfavorable movements in the under-
lying currency.296
Second, OTC options have a significant advantage over their ex-
change traded counterparts. Because exchange traded options are
standardized, a purchaser usually cannot use them to achieve a perfect
hedge for its currency exposure.29 In contrast, OTC options allow a
purchaser to tailor its contract to meet its specific hedging require-
ments.298 Because of these unique characteristics, OTC options make
up a vital component of the domestic financial markets' risk manage-
ment arsenal.
2. The Threat Posed by CFTC Jurisdiction
As the above description demonstrates, the stakes in the Treasury
Amendment controversy are enormous. With so much hanging in the
balance, it is not surprising that industry participants have been ex-
tremely sensitive to the threat of CFTC regulation. The Foreign Ex-
change Committee, a group composed of various U.S. institutions who
participate in the domestic currency option market, has warned that in
response to CFTC regulation "many large-scale participants in foreign
currency transactions, which historically have centered their business
activities in the Unites States, could... shift the center of their foreign
currency trading to their overseas offices to the detriment of the
United States markets. 299
294. See Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 24; BIS Survey, supra
note 2, at 44.
295. For a discussion of options see supra note 5.
296. For a discussion of futures and forwards see supra note 11.
297. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 25. OTC options
purchased through the interbank market are also one of the few hedging instruments
available to "corporations with exposures in exotic currencies." Id at 26.
298. Id. at 25; Group of Thirty Report, supra note 1, at 2-3; see also Amicus Brief of
Credit Lyonnais, Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd., The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. and
Societe Generale at 2, Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 1996 WL
403318 (No. 95-1181) (noting that the "clear preference for trading currency options
off-exchange is explained by the flexibility of terms, ease of participation and superior
liquidity of that market").
299. Amicus Brief for the Foreign Exchange Committee at *6, Dunn v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 95-1181, 1996 WL 392512. The Foreign Exchange
Committee argued further that:
Such a shift could result in a lessening of the liquidity of domestic foreign
currency markets, which in turn could have an adverse impact on those
United States businesses that engage in foreign trade and thus rely on those
markets to assist their dealings in international commerce. United States
firms transacting business abroad require highly liquid OTC markets so that
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Concededly, this kind of rhetoric may overstate the issue. If the
effect of CFTC regulation were to be as devastating as the Foreign
Exchange Committee's language would suggest, then surely many do-
mestic institutions would already have moved their currency opera-
tions offshore in response to the American Board of Trade and
Standard Forex decisions. Neither empirical nor anecdotal evidence is
available to indicate that this has happened.3°0 Indeed, it is difficult to
ascertain in any meaningful way what effect the Treasury Amendment
controversy has had on the growth and efficiency of the domestic in-
terbank market. As has been noted in another context "we cannot
run history twice with and without [such controversy], we can only
speculate. '30 1 This truism notwithstanding, the costs of CFTC regula-
tion would certainly be a very unappealing factor in any institution's
analysis of the relative benefits of remaining in the domestic market.
At a fundamental level, many institutions would not want the CFTC
to have regulatory oversight of, or access to, the details of their trad-
ing operations. Under the current regulatory scheme, CFTC regu-
lated entities are subjected to close scrutiny under a CFrC controlled
surveillance system.2 Moreover, an institution which chose to stay in
a domestic market regulated by the CFTC could be exposed to a wide
range of regulatory requirements. 0 3 In addition to the expense of re-
gistration for, and compliance with such requirements, it is even con-
ceivable that an institution could be forced to trade currency options
on a CMTC designated exchange.3 4
they can obtain the best prices for their currency purchases and sales. If the
OTC foreign currency markets here in the United States were to become
less liquid, those firms would likely have to shift their currency purchases
and sales to more liquid financial centers offshore, such as in London, with
operating hours less convenient to their business.
Id.
300. Empirical evidence is available on the relative growth of the world's major
currency trading centers. Notably, growth in the United States has lagged behind that
of its major competitor, the United Kingdom. In recent years, the United Kingdom's
currency market has grown at a rate of 60%, while growth in the United States grew
at exactly the average rate of 46%. BIS Survey, supra note 2, at 13-14. While it could
be suggested that the slower rate of growth in the United States is at least in part a
result of the uncertainty created by the Treasury Amendment, there is no empirical
evidence available which would support such a correlation.
301. Connie Bruck, The Predators' Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and
the Junk Bond Raiders 262 (1989) (quoting Harvard Business School Professor War-
ren Law's remarks on the issue of whether highly leveraged corporate takeovers deter
or promote economic growth and productivity).
302. Sheila C. Bair, Lessons from the Barings Collapse, 64 Fordham I. Rev. 1, 6
(1995) ("Large, unusual, or concentrated positions on one side of the market ... are
carefully scrutinized. The CFrC surveillance staff briefs the Commission weekly on
any unusual market conditions."). See 17 C.F.R. § 18 (1996) for the CFTC's reporting
requirements with regard to positions in regulated contracts.





If the prospect of such regulation were a reality, it is not difficult to
imagine a mass institutional relocation offshore. As it is, the currency
markets clearly prefer OTC currency trading to trading on a CFTC
regulated exchange; in the United States the turnover in OTC trading
is over twenty five times greater than trading on the exchanges. 0 5
Moreover, there is ample precedent for a move offshore in the rela-
tively recent controversy surrounding the CFTC's attempts to regulate
the OTC commodity swap market.31
In 1987 the CFTC announced an intention, in advance of enacting a
rule, to review whether it should regulate OTC commodity swaps.3 °7
Although it is extremely doubtful that currency swaps represent fu-
tures contracts governed by the CEA,3 °8 the Commission suggested in
1987 that it could determine that such swaps were unauthorized fu-
tures contracts made in violation of the CEA.3 °9 This suggestion was
reinforced by the CFTC's decision to launch an enforcement investi-
gation into the Chase Manhattan Bank's dealer activities in swaps.310
The swap industry's reaction to the CFTC's action was dramatic.
The domestic commodity swap business ceased to exist as all deals
moved overseas and a "firestorm of criticism" for the Commission's
actions ensued.311 Although the swaps business eventually returned
to domestic markets after Congress directed the CFTC to "promptly"
exercise its exemptive authority with respect to swaps, 312 it is easy to
imagine the devastating effects that would flow from similar CFTC
action in the currency option market. As one commentator has noted,
this is a "particularly critical period" in the evolution of the currency
option market-what happens now will dictate the structure of the
market for years to come. 3 Thus, if a large percentage of the institu-
tional participants to the domestic currency option market were to
move offshore, they could do so permanently.
305. See Central Bank Survey, supra note 157, at Annex II, tbl. 4.
306. See supra note 113 for an explanation of swaps transactions.
307. CFTC Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022
(1987).
308. Romano, supra note 15, at 55-58.
309. CFTC Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022
(1987).
310. Romano, supra note 15, at 55.
311. Id
312. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(5)(B) (1994). Congress directed the CFTC to exempt "appro-
priate persons" participating in the swaps markets. Id. § 6(c)(2)(B). Congress defined
the term "appropriate person" with the criteria ultimately used to determine eligibil-
ity for the Swaps Exemption. Id. § 6(c)3(A)-(K). For a summary of the criteria used
in the Swaps Exemption see infra note 316.
313. Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 18.
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3. The Inadequacy of the Trade Option and Swaps Exemptions
In the CFTC's view, the Industry's fears of over-regulation are un-
founded:" 4 many Interbank currency transactions are already exempt
from the CEA by either the Trade Option Exemption 31 5 or the Swaps
Exemption.316 It is true that these exemptions are currently available
to the interbank market as a means to ensure compliance with the
CEA and avoid the threat of unenforceability. Both the Foreign Ex-
change and Options Master Agreement ("FEOMA") and the Interna-
tional Currency Options Market Master Agreement ("ICOM"), the
master agreement contracts utilized by counterparties to option trans-
actions in the interbank market, currently contain clauses which pro-
vide for the use of either the Trade Option Exemption or the Swaps
Exemption." 7 As the following discussion demonstrates, however,
314. See id. at 20.
315. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a)(1996). The Trade Option Exemption applies to those op-
tions offered or sold by a person who "has a reasonable basis to believe" that (1) the
purchaser is "a producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling,"
the commodity involved in the transaction, and that (2) such purchaser "is offered or
enters into the commodity option transaction solely for purposes related to its busi-
ness as such." Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994).
In the years prior to the enactment of the Swaps Exemption, see infra note 316, the
Trade Option Exemption afforded the interbank market the most reliable safe harbor
from the CFTC's commodity option ban. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra
note 10, at 59. However, as this Note discusses at infra notes 318-22 and accompany-
ing text, because the CFTC has interpreted the Trade Option Exemption to be avail-
able only to hedging rather then speculative transactions, the practical benefit of the
Exemption is-for Interbank Industry purposes-extremely limited.
316. 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1996). The Swaps Exemption is generally only available to
very sophisticated participants. Among the Swaps Exemption's "eligible swap partici-
pants" are: (i) a bank or a trust company; (ii) a savings association or credit union;
(iii) an insurance company; (iv) an investment company subject to regulation under
the Investment Company Act of 1940; (v) a commodity pool formed and operated by
a person subject to regulation under the CEA; (vi) a corporation, partnership, propri-
etorship, organization, trust, or other entity which has assets exceeding S10,000,000;
(vii) an employee benefit plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974; (viii) any government entity; (ix) a broker-dealer subject to regulation
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; (x) a futures commission merchant,
floor broker, or floor trader subject to the CEA; and (xi) any natural person with total
assets exceeding $10,000,000. kl For a more comprehensive discussion of the Swaps
Exemption see infra part fI.B.b.
317. See FX Annual Report, supra note 157, at 55-115. FEOMA and ICOM are
considered to reflect "normal market practice for international interdealer transac-
tions." Id. at 92. The Schedules to both FEOMA and ICOM contain the following
provisions:
C. The following CFTC trade option representation [shall][shall not] apply:
Each party represents and warrants that it is a commercial user of or a
merchant handling the Currencies subject to each Option and was of-
fered or entered into each Option solely for purposes related to its busi-
ness as such.
D. The following CFTC eligible swap participant representation
[shall][shall not] apply:
Each Party represents and warrants that it is an "eligible swap partici-
pant" under, and as defined in, 17 C.F.R. Section 35.1.
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neither the Trade Option Exemption nor the Swaps Exemption is an
appropriate regulatory tool for the interbank market.
a. The Trade Option Exemption
As ICOM and FEOMA indicate, the Trade Option Exemption is
available to the Interbank Industry as a safe harbor from CFTC juris-
diction.318 However, the Trade Option Exemption is of very limited
utility to the Interbank Industry because the CFTC has taken the posi-
tion that it is available only to hedging transactions. In a 1984 inter-
pretive letter regarding foreign currency options, the Commission
acknowledged that "a narrow and limited class" of "banking institu-
tions could qualify as offerees and purchasers ... of foreign currency
options pursuant to [the Trade Option Exemption]," provided, how-
ever, that those institutions (1) "ordinarily engaged in a direct, com-
mercial use of the specific currency underlying the currency option
being offered," and (2) enter the option transaction for non-specula-
tive purposes related to the business as such.31 Under the CFTC's
view "[o]ption purchases that exceeded any bona fide hedging re-
quirements would be speculative and as such inconsistent with the
trade option exemption. '3 0
Because the Trade Option Exemption may not be used as a safe
harbor for speculation in currency options, it is of little practical bene-
fit to the Interbank Industry. The Industry has always used the in-
terbank market for both hedging and speculative purposes.321 In
addition, because the Industry's speculative use of currency options is
vital to the efficiency of the interbank market as a whole, the 'Trade
Option Exemption would seem an inappropriate regulatory tool for
the currency markets generally. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The activity of speculators is essential to the operation of a futures
market in that the composite bids and offers of large numbers of
Id. at 72, 91. ICOM's Guide explains that these representations "are designed to
ensure" that currency options transactions do not violate the CEA, as administered
by the CFrC, by requiring counterparties to warrant that their transactions fit within
the exemptions available under the CFTC's Trade Option Exemption, 17 C.F.R.
§ 32.4(a) (1995), or the Swaps Exemption, 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1995). FX Annual Re-
port, supra note 157, at 99. Significantly, ICOM's guide does not concede that cur-
rency options are in fact subject to the CEA: "If currency options are subject to [the
CEA], then they may be offered in the U.S. only pursuant to a regulatory exemption
from the general ban on the trading of such options contained in Section 4c(b) of the
Act." Id. at 100 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the regulatory uncertainty
reflected by FEOMA and ICOM see supra note 157.
318. See supra note 157.
319. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 84-7 (Feb. 22, 1984), reprinted in [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 1 22,025, at 28,595 [hereinafter Trade Option
Interpretative Letter].
320. Id.
321. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 10, at 3, 24. The Interbank In-
dustry writes options to respond to customer demand for hedging mechanism, but
also speculates by trading options for their own accounts. Id. at 24.
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individuals tend to broaden a market, thus making possible the exe-
cution with minimum price disturbance of the larger trade hedging
orders. By increasing the number of bids and offers available at any
given price level, the speculator usually helps to minimize price fluc-
tuations rather then to intensify them. Without the trading activity
of the speculative fraternity, the liquidity, so badly needed in fu-
tures markets, simply would not exist.32 2
Furthermore, the Trade Option Exemption would seem to be ill-
suited for the dynamic nature of the foreign currency trading environ-
ment.31 According to the CFTC, for the Trade Option Exemption to
apply, the grantor of an option "must take affirmative steps to ensure
that a purchasing institution... qualifies [under the Trade Option
Exemption]. Mere reliance upon the undocumented representations
of the purchaser would not be sufficient." 3 4 To require that traders
receive documentation prior to executing a trade is clearly not recon-
cilable with the reality of an environment in which traders must deter-
mine, often in a matter of seconds, whether a particular counterparty
is eligible for a particular transaction. 2
b. The Swaps Exemption
Although the Trade Option Exemption is of limited utility to the
Interbank Industry, the CFTC might make a better argument that the
Swaps Exemption provides a workable safe harbor for most sophisti-
cated participants in the currency market. As noted above, the Swaps
Exemption was enacted as result of the controversy surrounding the
Commission's efforts to regulate the commodity swap market.2 6 In
the CFTC's view, because the Swaps Exemption includes an express
322. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 360 n.11
(1982).
323. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
324. Trade Option Interpretive Letter, supra note 319, at 28,596.
325. As the following description illustrates, the mechanics underlying the foreign
currency trading market allow for incredibly quick and efficient execution of
transactions:
The foreign exchange market is an over-the-counter market. That is, there is
no one physical location where traders get together to exchange currencies.
Rather, traders are located in the offices of major commercial banks around
the world and communicate using computer terminals, telephones, telexes,
and other information channels. If a foreign exchange (FX) trader in a bank
in New York deals dollars for pounds with an FX trader in London, the
traders will, over the phone, agree on a price. Each trader will then enter
the trade in the bank's computer or other record system, and then get on
with the business of trading. The mechanics of actually transferring the cur-
rencies are not the traders' concern, so a trade takes a few seconds at most.
Later, however, the two banks will send each other confirmation messages
concerning the details of the trade, and will make arrangements for settle-
ment of the traders' contract.
J. Orlin Grabbe, International Financial Markets, 87 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis
omitted).
326. See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
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exemption for foreign currency options, it both neutralizes the In-
terbank Industry's basis for concern, and-in sustaining CFTC juris-
diction over traders who defraud small investors-is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the CEA.32 7
However, while the Interbank Industry "takes considerable com-
fort' '3 1 in the Swaps Exemption, its test for determining eligibility is
far too complex to be an appropriate regulatory tool for the dynamic
nature of the foreign currency trading environment.329 As this Note's
discussion of the Trade Option Exemption indicates, requiring traders
to plod through each of the Swaps Exemption criteria is not reconcila-
ble with the fast-paced reality of the foreign currency trading environ-
ment.330 A fundamental reason for the global currency market's
"enormous and growing trading volumes" is the ease and rapidity with
which modern communications technology allows market participants
to execute transactions.33' Thus, requiring adherence to the unwieldy
requirements of the Swaps Exemption would seem to constrain the
growth of the domestic currency markets.
Moreover, the Swaps Exemption is also a regulation that can be
withdrawn or reinterpreted on short notice.332 As such the Swaps Ex-
emption does not address the Interbank Industry's need for legal cer-
tainty. As the Treasury Department has stated:
[R]eliance on exemptive authority requires market participants to
operate, as a matter of caution ... and structure their transactions
to qualify for the regulatory exemption. If the CFTC later decides
to change the parameters of the exemption, market participants
would be forced to restructure their transactions accordingly or fall
back on the position that the transactions are not, in fact, futures or
options subject to the CEA, with all the accompanying legal
uncertainty. 333
In the current regulatory environment, the possibility of the CFTC
changing the parameters of the Swaps Exemption is perceived as a
real threat.3 4 As noted above, commentators have observed that in
recent years the CFTC has "aggressively expanded [its] authority,
327. See Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20.
328. Id
329. See supra note 316 for a summary of the Swaps Exemption's criteria for deter-
mining when a particular party is exempted from CFTC jurisdiction.
330. The Swaps Exemption, which articulates a complex set of criteria for deter-
mining eligibility, see supra note 316, is simply not an appropriate way to regulate
such transactions. For a description of the mechanics of foreign currency trading see
supra note 325.
331. Bhala, supra note 14, at 869.
332. See Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20 n.6.
333. Treasury Proposal, supra note 241, commentary at 3.
334. See Romano, supra note 15, at 58; see also Merton H. Miller & Christopher L.
Culp, Rein in the CFTC, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at A10 (arguing that Congress
needs to reign in the CFTC because the Commission has consistently exceeded its
statutory authority).
[Vol. 652364
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
seizing the opportunity to exert authority in the publicity surrounding
sizable investor losses, regardless of the jurisdictional fit."3 35
Such conduct not only gives the Interbank Industry legitimate cause
for concern, it also highlights the very reason that the Treasury
Amendment was enacted in the first place. As was recognized by Jus-
tice Scalia in the oral argument of the Dunn case:
[I]f Treasury were that confident [that the CFTC would not inter-
fere with the efficiency of the interbank market], they would never
have introduced the Treasury Amendment[.] If they were content
to rely upon the good offices of the... Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, they wouldn't have introduced the amendment at all.
They would have just said we'll cut our deal with the Commission.
We know they're reasonable people.
[I]f they trusted the CFTC to make these determinations, they
wouldn't have needed the Treasury Amendment. They would have
said that the CFTC has exemption authority. We will rely upon
their good offices ... to exempt those things that need exempting.
They were not willing to do that.336
Justice Scalia's argument is a good one. Indeed, its validity was recog-
nized in 1974, when Congress expressed its belief that regulation of
the interbank market under the CEA was unnecessary, because that
market "is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory
agencies.
'337
4. A Distinctly Defined Market Dichotomy: The Interbank
Industry and Retail Investors
As the Supreme Court recognized in Dunn, the justification for ex-
cluding the interbank market from CFTC regulation that existed in
1974 applies with equal force today.338 Even if the CFTC is precluded
from asserting its regulatory authority over the interbank market, that
does not mean that small unsophisticated investors will be at the
mercy of the fraudulent marketing of currency options by an un-
supervised Interbank Industry.
This is so because unsophisticated retail investors simply do not par-
ticipate in the interbank market.339 Of course, there are exceptions,
335. Romano, supra note 15, at 58; see also Jeff Bailey, Ponzi Case Spawns Setbacksfor CFTC, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1997, at B9 (reporting on CFTC Administrative Law
Judge Bruce C. Levine's characterization of portions of a CFTC administrative hear-
ing oral argument as "unbounded inanity" and "preposterous.").
336. Oral Argument, supra note 213, at 26, 36.
337. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 23, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5863.
338. No. 95-1181, 1997 WL 75492, at *5 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1997).
339. While there is no empirical research available which would confirm that the
unsophisticated general public does not participate in the interbank currency option
market, it may reasonably be inferred that the general public is as a practical matter
precluded from such participation. The vast majority of foreign currency transactions
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like Mr. Tauber whose activities were the focus of the Salomon Forex
litigation, and whose net worth exceeded $500 million.340 It hardly
needs to be pointed out, however, that Mr. Tauber does not appear to
have been in any need of protection from the CFTC.341 Indeed, for
the Fourth Circuit, Tauber's status as "a sophisticated investor" was
"amply demonstrated" by, inter alia, his very ability to trade with Sal-
omon Forex. 42
Mr. Tauber's "unusual" circumstances aside, 3  as a practical mat-
ter, unsophisticated investors do not have access to the interbank mar-
ket.3 " Significantly, in Salomon Forex, the Fourth Circuit noted that
apart from Tauber, "Salomon Forex did not conduct trading [in cur-
rency options] with any other individual investor-all of Salomon
Forex's other foreign currency investment clients were institutions." 345
The almost exclusively institutional nature of the interbank market is
a function of that market's fundamental characteristics. To participate
in the interbank market, an institution must find a willing
counterparty with whom to negotiate an OTC contract.346 Given the
nature of such transactions, which inherently involve assessments of
the creditworthiness of counterparties, it would appear impossible for
unsophisticated individual investors with neither the net worth, nor a
are conducted across proprietary financial communications networks like the Clearing
House Interbank Payment System ("CHIPS") and the Society for Worldwide In-
terbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT"). J. Orlin Grabbe, International Fi-
nancial Markets 66 (2d ed. 1991). For example, in New York, over 100 banks settle
their foreign exchange and eurodollar transactions through CHIPS. Id. Internation-
ally, over 3,000 banks in 67 countries are connected to SWIFT with an average of 1.1
million messages being sent among the banks via SWIFT each day. These messages
concern the terns of foreign exchange and other cross-border deals, and are transmit-
ted through centrally connected operating centers located in Brussels, Amsterdam,
and Culpeper, Virginia. In turn, these centers are connected by data transmission
lines to regional processors, with individual banks connected to such processors. Id.
Given these conditions it would appear impossible for an individual, unsophisticated
retail investor to participate in the interbank market.
340. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 969 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
341. It should be remembered that Tauber alleged commodities laws violations on
the part of Salomon Forex as a counterclaim in a suit brought by Salomon Forex to
collect on Tauber's trading debts. Salomon Forex, Inc., v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768,
769 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
342. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 978. The Fourth Circuit noted that Tauber's wholly
owned corporation, Westwood Options Inc., held a seat on the nation's largest foreign
currency exchange, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange; that Tauber maintained foreign
bank accounts which he used to carry out foreign currency transactions and that he
used foreign currency mortgages in connection with his real estate ventures. Id. at 969.
343. See Salomon Forex, 795 F. Supp. at 769 (noting that Mr. Tauber "is by all
accounts an unusual person").
344. See supra note 339.
345. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 969.
346. See Bhala, supra note 14, at 872-81 (describing the "real world" process by
which two counterparties, hypothetically Bangkok Bank and Citibank, negotiate a 5
billion yen OTC foreign currency transaction and noting the strong concerns each
counterparty would have for the creditworthiness of the other).
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recognizable institutional credit rating, to participate.3 7 In sum, the
CFTC has little justification for asserting jurisdiction over the in-
terbank market. As discussed above, however, in some instances the
lack of a jurisdictional mandate has done little to prevent the CFTC
from asserting its regulatory authority.3'
Yet any argument that CFTC jurisdiction over the interbank market
is necessary to achieve the remedial purposes of the CEA and to pro-
tect retail investors, fails to recognize that interbank market partici-
pants are already supervised by the federal banking agencies, or in
some circumstances by the SEC.3 9 As its name suggests, the main
players in the interbank derivative market generally, and the currency
option market specifically, are commercial banks.3 50 Because these
banks, play the role of "market-makers or intermediaries," 351 and in-
deed write most of the currency options traded in the interbank mar-
ket,3  they are necessarily involved in the vast majority of market
transactions.353 Indeed, about 84% of all worldwide foreign currency
trading occurs within two distinctly defined institutional categories:
the market-maker banks and other highly sophisticated financial enti-
ties such as investment companies and broker-dealers."
Investment companies and broker-dealers are subject to the SEC's
wide array of regulatory, enforcement, and disciplinary powers under
the federal securities laws.355 Though this does not mean that the
SEC enjoys jurisdiction over the entire interbank market-investment
347. See id.
348. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
349. See Quitmeyer & Yeres, supra note 9, at 20. Even if interbank transactions
were subject to CFTC jurisdiction, because so many of such transactions are cross-
border, it is difficult to foresee, in light of the jurisdictional and practical difficulties
necessarily involved, how exactly the CFrC would police them. Indeed, the BIS Sur-
vey reports that a larger share of currency options transactions in the US dollar "takes
place in the United Kingdom [(30%)] than ... in the United States (16%)." BIS
Survey, supra note 2, at 15.
350. See Romano, supra note 15, at 59; Grabbe, supra note 325, at 90; BIS Survey,
supra note 2, at 12, 44.
351. BIS Survey, supra note 2, at 44; see Grabbe, supra note 325, at 90.
352. See Grabbe, supra note 325, at 90; see also Committee on Futures Regulation,
supra note 10, at 24 ("Major commercial banks currently write most of the interbank
foreign currency options.").
353. BIS Survey, supra note 2 at 44; see also Grabbe, supra note 325, at 90 (describ-
ing the role of market maker banks in currency transactions); Committee on Futures
Regulation, supra note 10, at 24 (noting that although currency options are held by
large to mid-sized corporations active in international trade, such corporations "are
far more likely to buy foreign currency options than they are to write them").
354. Grabbe, supra note 325, at 90. The remaining 16% of counterparties to in-
terbank market transactions are "mainly corporate firms and governments." BIS Sur-
vey, supra note 2, at 44. Thus, the interbank market generally is used exclusively by
highly sophisticated institutions and not small retail customers.
355. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1994) (defining a broker-dealer as regulated by the
SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1994) (defining an investment company as regulated by the
SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940). For a comprehensive discussion of
the SEC's regulation of broker-dealers and investment companies under the federal
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companies and broker-dealers play a secondary role to that of the
large market-maker banks-the market as a whole remains more than
adequately regulated. This is so, because the market-maker banks,
which are counterparties (at least initially) to the vast majority of in-
terbank transactions,356 are closely supervised by the federal banking
agencies. 7 These agencies, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (the "OCC") impose a variety of requirements on
banks.358 In particular, all banks are subject to an annual examination
process, which for the largest represents a continuous on-site exami-
nation.359 Such examination includes a review of a bank's activities
with derivatives.36 ° If an examiner determines that a bank's use of
derivatives is inadequately controlled, he has considerable remedial
powers, including prohibiting an objectionable use as an "unsound"
banking practice.361 Banks dealing in derivatives are also required to
inform a customer if a particular product is unsuitable for them.362
For example, the OCC, which together with the Federal Reserve
Board regulates banks in the interbank market,363 requires banks
dealing in derivatives to ensure that their sales and trading staff suffi-
ciently understand derivatives, so that they are able to identify circum-
stances when a customer does not fully understand the risks
securities laws, see Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 35-45, 666-79 (3d ed. 1995).
356. See supra note 350.
357. See 12 U.S.C. § 3902 (1994) (defining the federal banking agencies); 1 Milton
R. Schroeder, The Law and Regulation of Financial Institutions, 7.01 (1995). An
individual bank's regulator depends on that bank's corporate status. Because the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks and the Federal Re-
serve Board regulates state chartered members of the Federal Reserve System, bank
holding companies and non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, these two
regulators generally have jurisdiction over interbank derivatives transactions. 12
U.S.C. §§ 93(a), 330 (1994). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates
state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 1848
(1994); see Romano, supra note 15, at 59 n.173; see also Mayer, supra note 1, at 390-
435 (1997) (describing the regulation of banks generally).
358. Schroeder, supra note 357, 7.01[1]; Romano, supra note 15, at 59.
359. Schroeder, supra note 357, 7.01[11]; Romano, supra note 15, at 59.
360. Romano, supra note 15, at 59. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(3) (1994) every in-
sured institution is required to submit quarterly reports of its financial condition and
activities to the appropriate federal banking agency; 12 U.S.C. §§ 161(a), 481 (1994)
requires national banks to submit such reports and other information to the OCC; 12
U.S.C. §§ 248(a)(1), 324, 325, 1847(d) (1994) confer similar authority to the Federal
Reserve Board with respect to member banks and bank holding companies. See gen-
erally 2 Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation, (1996) (describing the regu-
latory framework for banks' participation in various securities instruments).
361. Romano, supra note 15, at 59. The federal banking authorities have broad
authority to carry out their supervisory and examination functions. See Schroeder,
supra note 357, 7.01[2].
362. Romano, supra note 15, at 59 ("noting that "[b]ank examiner manuals and
agency memoranda provide detailed instructions concerning appropriate procedures
regarding derivatives.").
363. See supra note 357.
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associated with a particular product .3 1 Furthermore, the OCC "re-
quires that a bank's credit officers understand the applicability of a
particular transaction to the risks the customer is trying to
manage.
365
Finally, in addition to the protection provided by the federal bank-
ing agencies, or in some circumstances by the SEC, a non-bank
counterparty which believes that it has been harmed by misconduct in
the interbank market still has the remedies available under common
law-fraud and contract law. Such remedies, when combined with the
protection afforded by the federal banking agencies or the SEC, are
not only preferable to CFTC regulation from a market efficiency
standpoint, they are a more then adequate alternative.
5. The Gibson Greetings Example-Supervision by the Federal
Banking Agencies and the Remedies Available Under
Common Law Fraud and Contract Law-A
More Than Adequate Alternative to
CFTC Jurisdiction
As evidenced by the resolution of the highly publicized Gibson
Greetings suit against Bankers Trust, CFTC jurisdiction over the in-
terbank market is unnecessary, even in a worst case scenario where a
bank uses currency options to defraud a non-bank participant.3
Although the Gibson Greetings suit involved the fraudulent sale of
swaps rather than options by Bankers Trust, a large investment bank,
to Gibson Greetings, a manufacturing corporation, the outcome of the
case demonstrates why CFTC jurisdiction in the interbank market is
unnecessary. 367 The case was ultimately settled when Bankers Trust
forgave approximately $14 million of the $20.7 million Gibson owed
under its contracts. 368 Although Gibson alleged commodities laws vi-
olations, at least one commentator has noted they need not have; Gib-
son "did not need the... commodities laws for legal recourse against
Bankers Trust... as contract law and common-law fraud certainly
applied. ' 369 In fact, the settlement was precipitated by the discovery
of evidence which would have been the basis for a very strong com-
364. Romano, supra note 15, at 60; Risk Management of Financial Derivatives
Banking Circular 277 at 6 (Oct. 27, 1993), available in 1993 WL 640326, *3 (OCC)
[hereinafter BC-277].
365. Romano, supra note 15, at 59; BC-277, supra note 364, at *3.
366. For a comprehensive description of the circumstances of this suit see Mayer,
supra note 1, at 286-88.
367. Id. at 286-88, 312.
368. Michael Quint, Gibson Suit on Trades Is Settled, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1994, at
D1.
369. Romano, supra note 15, at 59 n.172. Not surprisingly, as a litigation strategy
Gibson Greetings alleged every cause of action available in suing Bankers Trust, in-
cluding securities and commodities laws violations. Id.
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mon law fraud case. 7 0 Ernest Patrikis, former general counsel and
now first vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,371
dismisses the relevance of the Gibson suit to anything other than
fraud.372 "The Gibson case," according to him, "was fraud.' 373
In terms of consequences for Bankers Trust, in addition to settling
Gibson's monetary claim, the Federal Reserve Board of New York
also exercised its authority and "in what is considered a severe disci-
plinary procedure, '374 executed a "written agreement" with Bankers
Trust which required the bank to provide increased information to its
swap customers, including daily valuation of their positions.375 Thus,
while the CFTC may think otherwise, significant evidence suggests
that CEA jurisdiction of the interbank market is unnecessary. In-
terbank market participants do not need the CFTC to assert claims for
breach or fraud in an option transaction: as the Gibson Greetings ex-
ample demonstrates such misconduct typically falls within the regula-
tory ambit of the federal banking agencies and in any case is clearly
actionable under common-law fraud and contract law.376
As noted above, this conclusion was apparent to Congress in 1974.
Although the growth in the use of the currency option market, and
indeed the derivatives market generally, is a relatively new phenome-
non, the participants in these markets are as subject to supervision
today as they were in 1974 when Congress passed the Treasury
370. The evidence came from tape recordings of BT's sales staff's discussion with
and about Gibson Greetings. As one commentator has explained:
Trading rooms, like the Oval Office in the White House, are places where
tape recordings of conversation are routine. Recordings are needed in the
trading rooms because so many transactions are achieved over the tele-
phone, without paper records or even computer verification. The tape ma-
chines capture everything a trader says, to his supervisors and colleagues and
subordinates as well as to his counterparties. Thus we know that Bankers
Trust routinely gave false information to Gibson about how much it was los-
ing on the instruments the bank had tailored for the company.
In one remarkable instance ... a BT salesman told Gibson that it would "not
go further in the hole" by entering... new positions when, in fact, Gibson
immediately incurred an additional unrealized loss of approximately
$4,954,000.
Mayer, supra note 1, at 287-88. On another occasion, an employee of BT's securities
affiliate told his supervisor "I think that [Gibson] have a pretty good understanding of
[their swap positions], but not perfect. And that's like perfect for us." Id. at 288.
371. Id at 307.
372. IL at 312.
373. Id (emphasis in original).
374. Romano, supra note 15, at 60.
375. Written Agreement by and Among Bankers Trust New York Corp. & Bankers
Trust Co. & BT Securities Corp. & Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Nos. 94-082-
WA/RB-HC et al., at 5 (Dec. 1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Romano,
supra note 15, at 60.
376. See Romano, supra note 15, at 58 (drawing the same conclusion with regard to
swaps transactions). As noted above, interbank market misconduct by a broker-
dealer or investment company would be subject to the regulatory ambit of the SEC.
See supra part II.B.4.
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Amendment as an expression of its belief that CEA regulation of the
interbank market was "unnecessary."3 77 Indeed, "as problems in the
banking industry deepened in the 1980s and 1990s, federal law gave
increasing legal authority to the banking regulatory agencies to super-
vise the banking institutions for which they were responsible." 37 Ad-
ditionally, broker-dealer and investment company participation in the
interbank market is subject to the SEC's substantial regulatory au-
thority.3 7 9 Therefore, because participants in the interbank market re-
main "more properly supervised by the bank regulatory agencies"-
or in the case of broker-dealers and investment companies, by the
SEC-and in any case retain fraud and contract remedies, CFTC reg-
ulation would be a superfluous and an unnecessary threat to market
efficiency.&° Thus, a new Treasury Amendment should exclude from
CFTC jurisdiction all currency option transactions involving a
counterparty already regulated by a federal banking agency or the
SEC.
C. A New Regulatory Regime
As is apparent from the above, the jurisdictional battle associated
with the Treasury Amendment controversy has been characterized by
aggressive conduct on both sides of the issue. On one side of the de-
bate, the Commission has frequently asserted jurisdiction with little
statutory justification. On the other side the Interbank Industry has
responded by making overblown predictions about the dire conse-
quences of CFTC regulation. Notwithstanding such conduct, both the
CFTC and the Interbank Industry have objectively reasonable
requirements.
Undoubtedly, the CFTC should be able to prevent unscrupulous
currency operators from defrauding unsophisticated retail customers.
At the same time, banks, corporations, investment companies and
other constituents of the Interbank Industry have the sophistication
and financial means to protect themselves without CFTC assistance.
Indeed, subjecting the Interbank Industry to the restrictions and legal
uncertainty associated with CFTC regulation could be an unnecessary
threat to the efficiency of domestic currency markets.
Thus, the Treasury Amendment, needs to be reformulated to incor-
porate a legal standard that would provide retail participants with the
complete protection of the CEA while simultaneously providing a
safe-harbor of maximum legal certainty for the Interbank Industry. It
is worth noting that the lower court opinions in American Board of
377. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 45, at 23, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5863.
378. Schroeder, supra note 357, 7.01[2].
379. See supra part M.B.4.




Trade, Salomon Forex, Standard Forex, and Dunn are all arguably rep-
resentative of the judiciary's endeavors to achieve such a standard,
although not through faithful adherence to the literal meaning of the
current Treasury Amendment. As an alternative to what will likely be
future judicial endeavors of that nature, this Note argues that Con-
gress should act quickly to thoroughly reformulate the Treasury
Amendment.
Currently, Congress is considering several proposed revisions of the
Treasury Amendment. Two of these proposals provide for CFTC ju-
risdiction of currency option transactions, but carve out a safe-harbor
for the Interbank Industry through use of the criteria articulated by
the Swaps Exemption. 81 As discussed above, the Swaps Exemption,
with its numerous and complex criteria for determining eligibility, is
simply not an appropriate regulatory tool for the dynamic nature of
381. Both the CFTC and Congressman Thomas W. Ewing (R. Ill), have proposed
revisions of the Treasury Amendment which would essentially use the criteria articu-
lated by the Swaps Exemption to provide a safe-harbor from CFTC regulation. Con-
gressman Ewing's proposal expressly uses the Swaps Exemption:
(ii) Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be
applicable to transactions in or transactions involving foreign currency, se-
curity warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repur-
chase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase
commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof to the general
public for future delivery conducted on a board of trade. For purposes of
this clause only, the term 'board of trade, as it applies to transactions in or
involving foreign currency, means any facility whereby standardized contracts
are systematically marketed to retail investors (other than individuals and enti-
ties described as eligible participants under the regulations of the Commission
published in the Federal Register on January 22, 1993, as codified in section
35.1(b)(2) of part 35 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations).
See H.R. 467, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1997) (emphasis added to reflect Congress-
man Ewing's modifications).
The CFTC's proposed amendment also uses the Swaps Exemption, although not
expressly. See CFrC Proposal, supra note 245, at 3. The CFrC Proposal begins with a
broad exclusion: "(I) Except as provided in clause (II) of this paragraph, nothing in
this Act shall be deemed to govern... any transaction in or involving" foreign cur-
rency. Il.
The CFTC Proposal then limits that broad exclusion, with the following language:
(II) If any transaction in or involving any defined financial instrument in-
volves the purchase or sale of the instrument for future delivery or is an
option... the provisions of the Act shall apply to such transaction if the
transaction is (i) on an organized exchange or (ii) offered to or entered into
by or with any person who is not an appropriate person.
Ia The term "appropriate person" is then defined as any person who would qualify
for the Swaps Exemption under § 4(c)(3) of the CEA, as codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(3)
(1994). Id; see supra note 312.
The proposal advocated by this Note would be less onerous to the Interbank Indus-
try than the regimes proposed by either Congressman Ewing or the CFTC. Those
proposals use the Swaps Exemption as a mechanism for exempting the Interbank
Industry from CFTC regulation. As is noted supra note 325 and accompanying text,
the Swaps Exemption which articulates a complex set of criteria for determining eligi-
bility is simply not an appropriate regulatory tool for the dynamic nature of the for-
eign currency trading environment.
[Vol. 652372
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
the currency trading environment.3" A third proposal, Senate Bill
257 ("S. 257"), introduced on February 4, 1997 by Senators Lugar and
Harkin, may offer some potential for a more satisfactory
alternativeT."
1. Senate Bill 257
S. 257 begins by unambiguously excluding foreign currency option
transactions from CFTC jurisdiction.3s In subclause (I), S. 257 states
that: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be
applicable to transactions in or involving foreign currency." a To en-
sure that no confusion arises as to what constitutes a transaction "in or
involving" foreign currency, S. 257 goes on to state that "For purposes
of this clause, an 'option' shall be considered to be a transaction at the
time it is purchased or sold and at the time, if any, that it is
exercised. ''3 6
Having established a broad exemption for transactions in foreign
currency options, S. 257 crafts a limitation designed to ensure that the
CFTC can protect the general public from the fraudulent marketing of
currency options. Although S. 257 broadly excludes currency option
transactions from the CEA, it sustains CEA jurisdiction over such
transactions where they "involve the sale thereof to the general public
for future delivery conducted on a board of trade."3s  S. 257 defines
the term "board of trade" as follows: "BOARD OF TRADE; FOR-
EIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS-The term 'board of trade,'
as applied to foreign exchange transactions described in subclause (I),
shall include unsupervised entities that are engaged in the systematic
marketing of standardized, non-negotiable foreign currency transac-
tions to retail investors. ' 388
Standing alone, this definition of "board[s] of trade" as "un-
supervised entities that are engaged in the systematic marketing of
standardized, non-negotiable foreign currency transactions to retail in-
vestors" '389 would seem to exclude Interbank Industry transactions in
foreign currency options. As noted above, interbank market transac-
tions are supervised by the federal banking agencies, or in the case of
broker-dealer and investment company transactions by the SEC.31°
382. See supra note 325.
383. S. 257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
384. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
385. Id. As before, S. 257 also includes exemptions for "security warrants, security
rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securi-
ties, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments." Id.
386. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(dd).
387. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
388. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(aa). It is not clear why S. 257 uses the different terms,
"retail investors" and "general public," to describe essentially the same thing.
389. I& (emphasis added).
390. See supra notes 357-76 and accompanying text.
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Such transactions are non-standardized, negotiable and are not system-
atically marketed to retail investors. 9'
Unfortunately, S. 257's use of the term "shall include" indicates that
a "board of trade" may encompass much more than just "un-
supervised entities that are engaged in the systematic marketing of
standardized, non-negotiable foreign currency transactions to retail in-
vestors." Indeed, the use of the verb "include" suggests strongly that
the whole definition is merely one meaning for the term "board of
trade." This makes S. 257, as a whole, susceptible to a reading that
would provide for CFTC jurisdiction over the Interbank Industry.
S. 257 has other problems. In its definitional section, S. 257 directs
the CFTC to define the terms "general public" and "retail investors,"
with the limitation that "the Commission shall not include in the defi-
nition of 'retail investors' a natural person with total assets that ex-
ceeds $10,000,000. '' 392 If a $10,000,000 asset test were the only
criterion necessary to determine eligibility for exemption from CFTC
jurisdiction, S. 257 would seem to manifest an appreciation of the pro-
cedural realities of the foreign currency trading environment. Such a
test would be considerably easier to apply than the numerous and
complex criteria provided by the Swaps Exemption.3 93 A $10,000,000
asset test would also have substantive appeal: It would provide an
effective means to distinguish between individuals like Mr. Tauber,
who do not need CFTC protection, and the unsophisticated retail in-
vestors, like those defrauded in Standard Forex, who do.
Under S. 257, however, an asset test may not be the only criteria
used to determine currency option transactions' eligibility for exclu-
sion from the CEA. As noted above, under S. 257 it is the CFTC that
would determine eligibility for such exclusion. 94 Indeed, because S.
257 suggests that in determining eligibility the CFTC should take into
account the criteria articulated by the Swaps Exemption,395 it is quite
possible that the Interbank Industry would face the prospect of having
to apply each of the Swaps Exemption's criteria to each transaction in
order to avoid the threat of unenforceability. 396
Subclause II of S. 257 would create further uncertainty. Standing
alone, subclause (II) emphasizes that CEA jurisdiction over foreign
currency should be distinct from that of inter alia, the federal banking
agencies and the SEC:
391. See supra note 1 for a discussion of OTC derivatives transactions.
392. S. 257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(cc) (1997). A $10,000,000 asset-
test per natural person is one of the Swaps Exemption's criteria for determining eligi-
bility. See supra note 316.
393. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
394. S. 257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(cc) (1997).
395. Id
396. As is discussed at supra part III.B.3.b, the Swaps Exemption is not an appro-
priate regulatory tool for the dynamic nature of the foreign currency trading
environment.
[Vol. 652374
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
(II) OTHER AGENCIES-Nothing in subclause (I) shall effect the
powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Department of the Treasury, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, any agency of State govern-
ment with the authority to charter, regulate, or license banks, or any
State insurance regulatory agency, under this Act or any other pro-
vision of law.397
The intended significance of subclause II, within the context of S. 257
as a whole, is unclear. Subclause II could be construed to mean that
interbank market transactions which do not involve the "general pub-
lic" or "retail investors" as ultimately defined by the CFIC,398 are
excluded from the CEA and instead remain subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal banking agencies and the SEC. Because
such a reading allows for potentially broad CFTC jurisdiction over
interbank market transactions-it is, after all, the Commission that
would define the terms "general public" and "retail investors"-it
would not satisfactorily address the need of the Interbank Industry to
be free from the threat of CFTC regulation. On the other hand, sub-
clause (II) could conceivably be intended to mean that the CFTC can-
not, under any circumstances, assert jurisdiction over an interbank
participant who is already regulated by a federal banking agency or
the SEC-even where that participant engages in transactions with
the "general public" or "retail investors" as ultimately defined by
CFTC.39 Although that reading would address the Interbank Indus-
try's real need to be free from the threat of CFTC regulation, it is not
necessarily supported by the literal meaning of S. 257 as a whole. As
such, subclause II, and indeed S. 257 in it entirety, fail to provide an
exclusion of sufficient legal certainty for the Interbank Industry.
2. Toward an Ideal Alternative
Although in many respects S. 257 lacks the clarity necessary to
achieve an ideal alternative to the current Treasury Amendment, it
397. S. 257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (1997). Subelause I's refer-
ence to the SEC could give rise to another jurisdictional battle over the regulatory
status of currency options. Because in Dunn the Supreme Court declined to expressly
address the issue of whether the investment contracts involving the sale of foreign
currency options could in some circumstances constitute "securities," S. 257 could
conceivably provide a future basis for SEC assertion of jurisdiction over Interbank
currency option transactions which are already regulated by the federal banking agen-
cies. For a discussion of the investment contract issue raised by the Dunn case see
supra note 212.
398. S. 257, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii)(cc).
399. This may well be the intended meaning of subclause II. See Aaron Lucchetti &
Jeffrey Taylor, Bid to Overhaul Futures Trading Sparks Debate, Wall St. J., Feb. 18,
1997, at C21 (noting that S. 257 "urge[s] that the CFTC's jurisdiction in these markets
be limited to off-exchange products that aren't regulated by other government arms
but that are offered to the general public.").
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does help to identify several useful principals for reform. It does so by
highlighting the requirements necessary to adequately reconcile the
legitimate needs of both the Interbank Industry and the CFTC. An
ideal regulatory regime would have three essential characteristics.
First, it would contain a broad exclusion from CFTC regulation for
Interbank Industry transactions in foreign currency options. Second,
it would clearly proscribe CFTC interference with Interbank partici-
pants where those participants are already regulated by the federal
banking agencies or the SEC. Third, an ideal regulatory regime would
establish a bright-line, facile test for determining when CFTC jurisdic-
tion over currency option sales to unsophisticated investors is
appropriate.
The Treasury Department has proposed a revision of the Treasury
Amendment which would essentially incorporate all three of these
characteristics (the "Treasury Proposal" or the "Proposal"). 00 The
Treasury Proposal begins by prohibiting the CFTC from even assert-
ing jurisdiction over foreign currency transactions, including options,
unless those transactions take place on an organized exchange:
(ii) Except as provided for in subsection (iii), this chapter shall not
apply to and the Commission shall have no jurisdiction over trans-
actions in or in any way involving foreign currency, unless the trans-
action is a contract for future delivery and is conducted on an
organized exchange.40'
The Proposal goes on to provide that in addition to jurisdiction over
organized exchanges,402 the Commission would retain anti-fraud juris-
diction over "transactions in or in any way involving foreign currency
400. Treasury Proposal, supra note 241, at 7-9.
401. IL § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Treasury Proposal also provides that:
This chapter shall not apply to and the Commission shall have no jurisdiction
over transactions in or in any way involving security warrants, security right,
resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securi-
ties, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless the transac-
tion-(I) is a contract of sale for future delivery, or an option on either a
future or a commodity that is not a security, and (II) is conducted on an
organized exchange.
Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(iv).
402. To respond to the uncertainties created by the Standard Forex holding, as dis-
cussed supra part III.A.2.b, the Treasury Proposal supplies a detailed definition of the
term "organized exchanges." That definition provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subclause, the term "organized ex-
change" means-
(1) a board of trade designated by the Commission as a contract market
or a physical or electronic market place or similar facility affiliated
with board of trade designated as a contract market, or
(2) a physical or electronic market place or similar facility through
which unaffiliated persons, for their own accounts or for the ac-
counts of their customers, enter into and execute arms' length bind-
ing transactions by accepting bids and offers made by one person
that are open to all persons who conduct business through such a
market place or similar facility.
[Vol. 652376
1997] THE REGULATORY STATUS OF FX OPTIONS
if the transaction is a contract of sale for future delivery or an option
and is conducted between any unregulated person and a retail
customer." 3
In defining the terms "unregulated person" and "retail customer,"
the Treasury Proposal crafts a bright-line test for determining CFTC
jurisdiction. The Proposal defines an "unregulated person" as any
person who is not currently regulated by one of the federal banking
agencies or is not a broker-dealer or investment company regulated
by the SEC.4°4 Borrowing two exemptive criteria from the SEC's
Regulation D,1 5 the Treasury Proposal then defines the term "retail
customer" as any natural person with a net worth above $1,000,000 or
with an annual income in excess of $200,000 (or $300,000 when com-
bined with one's spouse)." 6
Through these definitions, the Treasury Proposal would seem to
provide an easily administered test for determining whether a particu-
lar transaction is subject to the CEA: For transactions between enti-
ties that are regulated by the federal banking agencies or the SEC,
and natural persons whose net worth exceeds $1,000,000, or whose
annual income is in excess of $200,000 the CEA does not apply and
(b) Notwithstanding subclause [](a), the term "organized exchange" does
not include-
(1) parties engaged in privately negotiated bilateral transactions, even if
such parties use electronic means to communicate or execute trans-
actions ....
Id. § 2(a)(1)(A)(v)(IV). This definition, in the Treasury's view "clarifies that entities
engaged in the business of buying or selling Treasury Amendment instruments, such
as banks, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, and government securities
dealers and brokers, will not be deemed to be organized exchanges; rather, the defini-
tion includes entities that serve as a marketplace for arms' length transactions." Id.
commentary at 6.
403. Id- § 2(a)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added); see 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6o (1994) (granting
the CFrC the authority to proscribe fraudulent conduct in activities governed by the
CEA).
404. Treasury Proposal, supra note 241, § 2(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). The Treasury Proposal
also exempts affiliates of regulated persons, but only to the extent that the affiliates
conduct exempted transactions through regulated persons. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 3902 (defining the federal banking agencies); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (defining a broker-
dealer as regulated by the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (defining an investment company
as registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940). For a discussion of the
role of the federal banking agencies and the SEC in regulating the Interbank Industry
see supra part Im.B.4-5. As is discussed at supra note 397, with regard to S. 257, the
Treasury Proposal's reference to the SEC could give rise to another jurisdictional bat-
tie over the regulatory status of currency options. Because in Dunn the Supreme
Court declined to expressly address the issue of whether the investment contracts
involving the sale of foreign currency options could in some circumstances constitute
"securities," the Treasury Proposal could conceivably provide a future basis for asser-
tion of SEC jurisdiction over Interbank currency option transactions which are al-
ready regulated by the federal banking agencies. For a discussion of the investment
contract issue associated with the Dunn case see supra note 212.
405. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1996) (defining a class of sophisticated investors for
whom the full protections of federal securities regulation is considered unnecessary).
406. Treasury Proposal, supra note 241, § 2(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).
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the CFTC may not assert jurisdiction. Conversely, where a transac-
tion is between any entity unregulated by the federal banking agencies
or the SEC, and a natural person with net worth of less than
$1,000,000, or with less than $200,000 in annual income the CEA ap-
plies and the CFTC has jurisdiction. Although there may be some
disagreement over whether the jurisdictional threshold established by
this test is appropriate," 7 the test itself appears sufficiently facile to
satisfy the requirements of the fast-paced currency trading environ-
ment.4°8 Certainly, it offers a more practical alternative to the Swaps
Exemption.40 9 At the same time, the test would allow the CFTC to
regulate the sale of currency options to the unsophisticated general
public. Significantly, the CFrC's enforcement actions in American
Board of Trade, Dunn and Standard Forex involved currency transac-
tions between unregulated entities and retail customers as defined by
the Treasury Proposal.41°
As such, the Treasury Proposal's jurisdictional test, together with its
provisions for proscribing CFrC interference with the interbank mar-
ket, would seem to come close to achieving an ideal regulatory re-
gime. With such a regime in place, courts would no longer have to
reach strained readings of the Treasury Amendment in order to
achieve equitable results. All three of the cases which have reached
such strained readings, namely American Board of Trade, Dunn, and
Standard Forex, did so in circumstances involving transactions be-
tween what the Treasury Proposal defines as unregulated entities and
retail customers. which would remain subject to CFTC jurisdiction.'
Under the Treasury Proposal, the strained interpretations of the
Treasury Amendment reached by these courts would not have been
necessary: The CFTC would have had the jurisdiction necessary to
redress the fraud involved. At the same time, the Interbank Industry
would have been secure in the knowledge that because it is already
regulated by the federal banking agencies or the SEC, its currency
option transactions would remain free from CFTC regulation.
407. Because the Treasury Amendment's jurisdictional test is based on the SEC's
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1996), a strong argument could be made that it is
appropriate. If the SEC believes that natural persons with net worth in excess of
$1,000,000, or with annual income in excess of $200,000 are sufficiently sophisticated
to be able to protect themselves without the full protection (or the encumbrances) of
the securities laws, there would seem to be little justification for arguing that the same
persons need the regulatory protection (or the encumbrances) of the CEA. For ex-
ample, Dr. Tauber, the principal protagonist in the Salomon Forex litigation whose
net worth exceeded $1,000,000 and who would therefore have qualified for the Treas-
ury Proposal's exemption from the CEA, could not reasonably be characterized as
someone in need of the CEA's protection. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d
966, 975 (4th Cir. 1993); supra part II.B.
408. For a discussion of the practical requirements of foreign currency traders see
supra part III.B.3.
409. For a discussion of the Swaps Exemption see supra part III.B.3.b.
410. For a discussion of these enforcement actions see supra parts II and III.A.2.a.
411. For a discussion of these cases see supra parts II and III.A.2.a.
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CONCLUSION
As the derivatives markets have expanded they have posed tremen-
dous definitional challenges to preexisting regulatory regimes. The
preexisting regulatory scheme created by the Treasury Amendment
has proved inadequate to cope with the subsequent development of
the interbank market in currency options. Thus, as it is currently for-
mulated, the Treasury Amendment is inherently flawed. As a result,
courts will continue to reach strained readings of the Treasury
Amendment unless it is revised in a manner that reconciles the legiti-
mate needs of the Industry with the equally legitimate needs of the
CFTC. Although in Dunn the Supreme Court resolved the issues as-
sociated with the conflicting interpretations of the term "transactions
in foreign currency," the recently emerged conflict between the Stan-
dard Forex and Frankwell Bullion courts' interpretations of the term
"board of trade" threatens to prolong the Treasury Amendment con-
troversy indefinitely. Indeed, that conflict indicates that decisions in
this area will continue to be made on an ad hoc basis, a situation offer-
ing little predictive value to a market which demands legal certainty.
Clearly, a legislative revision of the Treasury Amendment is neces-
sary. As an alternative to the current Treasury Amendment this Note
proposes a regulatory regime with three essential characteristics.
First, an ideal regulatory regime would unambiguously exclude In-
terbank Industry transactions in foreign currency option transactions
from CEA jurisdiction. Second, it would proscribe CFTC interference
with Interbank participants where those participants are already regu-
lated by the federal banking agencies or the SEC. Third, an ideal re-
gime would establish a bright line, facile test for determining when
CFTC jurisdiction over currency option sales to unsophisticated inves-
tors is appropriate. Because the Treasury Proposal would seem to in-
corporate all three of these characteristics, it, rather than the other
proposals currently being considered by Congress, should form the
basis of any new regulatory regime.
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